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BEYOND NAME, RANK AND SERIAL NUMBER:
"NO COMMENT" JOB REFERENCE POLICIES,
VIOLENT EMPLOYEES AND THE NEED FOR
DISCLOSURE-SHIELD LEGISLATION
Markita D. Cooper*
They are reluctant, if not totally fearful, of telling you about an em-
ployee.... If it's someone who's blemished, they will never say,
"No, we'd never rehire him." Regarding character, we are wander-
ing in a wasteland.'
INTRODUCTION
As Paul Calden calmly walked into a crowded cafeteria in a Florida of-
fice building, no one knew that their former coworker would transform an
ordinary lunch hour into a scene of death and terror. But within minutes of
entering the cafeteria, Calden shot five of his former supervisors. The at-
tack left three people dead and two seriously injured. Thirty others wit-
nessed the shooting rampage, as Calden opened fire and proclaimed, "This
is what you get for firing me." All of the victims were supervisors and ex-
ecutives employed by Fireman's Fund Insurance, and all had been in-
volved in terminating Calden's employment with the company.
Fireman's Fund hired Calden after he left a job with Allstate Insurance
Company. During his nine-month tenure at Allstate, Calden made death
threats against coworkers, confronted peers and supervisors, and brought a
pistol to the office. Allstate fired Calden after he brought the gun to work.
Although company policy prohibited giving references, managers did not
* Associate Professor, Golden Gate University School of Law. A.B. 1979, Stanford University;
J.D. 1982, University of Virginia School of Law. I give my sincere thanks to Dennis P. Duffy,
Joan W. Howarth, Maria L. Ontiveros, Marci B. Seville and Jon H. Sylvester for encouragement
and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also gratefully acknowledge the research
assistance of Amber Bell, Bryan Murray, Heidi Quan, and Scott Wyckoff.
I Tim Weiner, Fearing Suits, Companies Avoid Giving Job References, N.Y. Times, May 8,
1993, at 37 (quoting Alan Schonberg, chief executive officer of Management Recruiters Interna-
tional of Cleveland, Ohio).
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follow the policy. Instead, Calden received a reference letter explaining
that he had voluntarily resigned as part of a corporate restructuring. All-
state said nothing to Fireman's Fund about Calden's history of violent
conduct in the workplace.
2
The survivors and families of those killed subsequently sued Allstate,
3
alleging that the insurance company knew Calden had engaged in violent
behavior while working there.4 The complaint charged that Allstate had
fraudulently failed to disclose Calden's true work history and failed to
warn Fireman's Fund of the danger posed by Calden. 5 Moreover, the
plaintiffs alleged that Allstate had an affirmative duty to disclose Calden's'
violent propensities. 6 After more than a year of litigation, Allstate settled
the case for an undisclosed sum.
7
Paradoxically, if Allstate had followed its policy of not providing ref-
erences-saying nothing about Calden or providing only his dates of em-
ployment and salary information-existing law effectively would have
immunized Allstate from suit. Without Allstate's misleading reference,
there would have been no legally cognizable grounds for recovery. If All-
state had provided only a "name, rank, and serial number" reference dis-
closing Calden's dates of employment and salary history, the company
would have had no legal obligation to tell a prospective employer about
Calden's history of workplace violence.
8
Following both conventional wisdom and legal advice, many employ-
ers provide only dates of employment and salary information in response
to reference inquiries. 9 By responding to a reference inquiry with limited
2 The story of this shooting is culled from local news reports. See, e.g., Paul de la Garza & Lisa
Frederick, Man Kills Three in Tampa Cafe, St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 28, 1993 at IA; Fired Em-
ployee Kills 3 Bosses in Tampa Firm, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 28, 1993, at IA. See also
Plaintiffs' Amended Wrongful Death Complaint at 3-6, Jerner v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1995) (No. 93-09472); infra notes 128-140 and accompanying text.
3 The plaintiffs also sued Calden's estate. See Plaintiffs' Amended Wrongful Death Complaint,
supra note 2, at 1. Calden committed suicide within hours of the shootings. See de la Garza & Fre-
derick, supra note 2.
4 Plaintiffs' Amended Wrongful Death Complaint, supra note 2, at 4-5, 8, 11.
5 Id. at 5.
6 Id. at8-11.
7 Allstate settled the case in October 1995. Allstate Settles Suit on Reference for Killer, Nat'l
L.J., Oct. 16, 1995, at B2.
8 See discussion infra at Part II, Section A.
9 For example, in a 1995 survey, nearly 40 percent of responding human resource professionals
agreed that they should "refuse to provide job-related information to prospective employers, even
if the information is honest and factual." In addition, 63 percent of respondents reported that they
or members of their organizations had "refused to provide information about a former employee
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information, employers seek to avoid defamation and other claims based
on negative references.' 0 The trend towards increased use of "no com-
ment" reference policies has been widely reported in the legal, business,
and popular press."' In addition, recognizing that fear of litigation drives
employers to adopt no-reference policies, many legislators and human re-
source management lobbyists have pushed for statutes that provide quali-
fied immunity against lawsuits arising out of job reference practices.
1 2
Before the publicity over the Allstate case, only five states provided
for job reference-related qualified immunity by statute.' 3 In 1995, nine ad-
ditional states placed such legislation on the books. 14 By 1997, a clear
trend had emerged in state legislatures, with more than half of the states
out of fear of a lawsuit." Society for Human Resource Management ("SHRM"), Reference Check-
ing Leaves Employers in the Dark: Legal Concerns a Stumbling Block, SHRM Survey Says (News
Release, June 26, 1995); SHRM, Reference Checking Survey (1995); see also Robert S. Adler &
Ellen R. Peirce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their "No Comment" Policies Regarding Job
References: A Reform Proposal, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1381, 1383-87 (1996); Bradley Saxton,
Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Pro-
posal for Reform, 13 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 45 (1995). The popular press also has taken note of this
trend. See, e.g., James Walsh, Checking References: Amid Fear of Lawsuits, Employers Grow
Wary of Giving References, Star Trib. (Minneapolis), Feb. 4, 1997, at I A; Weiner, supra note 1, at
37.
10 See discussion infra Part II.
11 As Saxton observed:
The lay press, including business-oriented journals, has been fairly consistent
in reporting that "no comment" reference strategies are being widely em-
ployed; the commentators have also been consistent in attributing the preva-
lence of those strategies to employers' negative perceptions of the current legal
environment .... Attorneys who have written or otherwise commented pub-
licly about reference practices also have generally confirmed that "no com-
ment" reference strategies are widely used by employers today.
Saxton, supra note 9, at 48.
12 See discussion infra Part ILl.
13 Ironically, Florida, the scene of the Allstate events, was the first state to adopt a statute pro-
viding employers with such a qualified immunity. Florida enacted its shield statute in 1991. Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West 1997). However, the events leading to the Allstate litigation occurred
before the Florida legislature enacted the reference shield law. By 1994, Alaska, California, Colo-
rado, and Georgia also had enacted job reference immunity legislation. Alaska Stat. § 09.65.160
(Michie 1996); Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c) (West Supp. 1998); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-114 (1997); Ga.
Code Ann. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1997).
14 Ind. Code. Ann. § 22-5-3-1 (Michie 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-119a (Supp. 1996); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 23:291 (West Supp. 1997); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 1997);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 61 (West Supp. 1998);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.178 (Michie Supp. 1 1996); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1997); and
Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (1997).
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having enacted reference shield statutes. 15 Specifically, twenty-nine states
had passed legislation designed to protect employers from suits based on
job references. 16 Eleven additional states currently have bills pending. 17
Although much of the rhetoric surrounding reference shield laws concerns
the increasing difficulty of obtaining job references, 18 the flurry of legisla-
tive activity following Allstate suggests that the Allstate case and other
high profile workplace violence situations played a significant role in state
legislatures' decisions to enact reference shield legislation. 19
15 Twelve additional states had enacted reference shield statutes by the end of 1996. See Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1361 (West Supp. 1997); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 708 (Supp. 1996); Idaho
Code § 44-201 (1997); 745 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997); Md. Code. Ann., Cts.
& Jud. Proc. § 5-423 (Supp. 1997); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.452(2) (West Supp. 1997);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.71 (Anderson Supp. 1996); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1 (Supp. 1997);
S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. Codified Laws § 60-4-12 (Michie
Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.487 (West 1996); and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-113 (Michie
1997).
16 This total includes statutes enacted in Iowa, North Carolina and North Dakota during 1997.
Iowa Code § 91B.2 (signed by governor on May 26, 1997), available in LEXIS Statenet 1997;
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-539.12 (Supp. 1997); N.D. Cent. Code § 34-02-18 (Supp. 1997).
17 As of this writing, bills were pending in Alabama, Hawaii, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington. See H.B. 303, 1998
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998); S.B. 194, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998); H.B. 3540. 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997);
H.B. 2069, 77th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1997); S.B. 2060, 181st Gen. Ct., 1997 Reg. Sess.
(Mass. 1997); H. File 1069, 80th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 1997); H. File 1070, 80th Leg. Sess. (Minn.
1997); S. File 752, 80th Leg. Sess. (Minn. 1997); H.B. 1345, 89th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
1998); Leg. B. 790, 95th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 1997); Ass. B. 911, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998);
Ass. B. 1350, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998); Ass. B. 2838, 207th Leg. (N.J. 1997); Ass. B. 2841, 207th
Leg. (N.J. 1997); S.B. 1870, 207th Leg. (N.J. 1997); H.B. 338, 182d Gen. Ass, 1997-98 Reg. Sess.
(Penn. 1997); H.B. 166, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997); S.B. 139, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997);
H.B. 1886, 55th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997).
18 See, e.g., Armond Budish, Employers Giving References Protected from Suits, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Apr. 28, 1996, at 3F (describing the Ohio shield statute and noting that the statute "is de-
signed to promote accurate reporting by an employee's previous employers so prospective employ-
ers can make well-informed decisions"); G. Daniel ElIzey & Charles F. Thompson, Jr., Bill Pro-
tects Employers When They Provide References, S.C. Bus. J., May 1996, at I (stating that spon-
sors of shield law "meant to provide employers added protection from legal liability and to encour-
age honest and useful job references"); Randolph Heaster, Labor Criticizes Bill Governing Ex-
Employees, Kansas City Star, Apr. 7, 1995, at BI (explaining view of legislation's cosponsor:
"[tlhe bill originated because of complaints from public and private employers that they could not
get certain information about people applying for jobs").
19 Numerous press reports analyzing the statutes have noted such a connection. See, e.g., David
Heckelman, Senate Rejects Extended Immunity for Work Records, Chi. Daily L. Bull., May 21,
1996, at 1 (noting view of State Sen. Chris Lauzen, sponsor of the Illinois shield bill, that bill "was
intended to address situations in which employers have failed to report violent conduct by former
employees, fearing that they might be sued for defamation"); Tannette Johnson-Elie, Bill Could
Ease Fear of Giving References: State Legislation Gives Employers Immunity, Milwaukee J. Sen-
tinel, June 2, 1996, at 1 (identifying lobbyists who asserted that the statute would help employers
protect themselves from people with histories of workplace violence as a catalyst for the Wisconsin
statute); Diana Kunde, Bill Aims to End Silence Over Job References, Dallas Morning News, Sept.
8, 1996, at 1H (discussing litigation that "helped spur" the need for shield legislation and focusing
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State lawmakers intend the recently enacted statutes to remedy the
problem of employers who refuse to disclose information about former
employees' job performance. 20 Under the statutes, an employer sued based
on a job reference will not be held liable if the employer acted in good
faith. 21 According to its proponents, statutory immunity encourages em-
ployers to break the code of silence and speak about their employees'
work performance. 2
2
Although no formal studies have analyzed the impact of reference
shield statutes, anecdotal reports indicate that the new statutes have had
little effect on employers, the majority of which are adopting "wait and
see" attitudes. 23 In part, such a conservative posture may be justified be-
cause the statutes generally offer little more protection than what already
exists at common law.24 Until fears of job reference-related lawsuits and
liability are overcome, 25 employers have little incentive to provide refer-
ences. This failure to cooperate becomes critical when employers maintain
on Allstate as "[o]ne suit in particular [that] has gained attention"); Nita McCann, Employers Who
Give Honest Job References May Not Need Further Legal Protection, Miss. Bus. J., Sept. 23, 1996,
at I (noting that Allstate has called attention to how vague reference policies arising from employ-
ers' fears of lawsuits can lead to "bloodshed," and as a result, states are enacting shield laws);
States Adopt "Good Faith" Employment Reference Laws, Legal Intelligencer, July 3, 1996, at 4,
available in LEXIS, News Library, LGLINT File (noting that "high profile cases of workplace
violence ... have brought to the forefront the importance of reference checking and receiving good
information about an employee's past work history").
20 See infra Part I1, Section A.
21 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Part III, Section B.
23 See infra Part Ill, Section C.
24 Alex B. Long, Note, Addressing the Cloud Over Employee References: A Survey of Recently
Enacted State Legislation, 39 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 177, 221-222 (1997). But see Adler & Peirce,
supra note 9, at 1451-52 (arguing that some statutes "appear to narrow and to undermine existing
legal protections unwittingly").
25 Long, supra note 24, at 223. Although the statutes reduce the likelihood that an employer ulti-
mately will be held liable in a job reference-related suit, employers fear not only liability, but law-
suits themselves. Many commentators have noted that employers face high costs in defending law-
suits, even when they prevail. See, e.g., Adler & Peirce, supra note 9, at 1424; Markita D. Cooper,
Between a Rock and a Hard Case: Time for a New Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication, 72
Notre Dame L. Rev. 373, 374-75 (1997); 0. Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facilitating the Flow of
Truthful Personnel Information: Some Needed Change in the Standard Required to Overcome the
Qualified Privilege to Defame, 26 Am. Bus. L.J. 305, 316-18 (1988); Saxton, supra note 9, at 76;
Long, supra note 24, at 191-92, 222-23. Of course, no statute that stops short of giving employers
absolute immunity will preclude lawsuits, nor will statutes alone prevent lawsuits challenging em-
ployer references. See Long, supra note 24, at 225-28 (arguing that the statutory approach must be
combined with other mechanisms, such as educating employers on how to avoid reference-based
defamation claims, and correcting the misconception that employers face a great risk of being sued
for providing job references).
292 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 5:2
no-reference policies for employees who have engaged in violent conduct
on the job.
26
This Article proposes a legislative model that combines qualified im-
munity with a limited affirmative duty for employers, requiring them to
disclose information about violent workplace conduct by employees for
whom a reference is requested. 27 Part I describes job reference policies and
practices and the incidence of workplace violence. Part II discusses an
employer's potential common law tort liability when an employee receives
an unfavorable job reference. Part III provides an overview of current ref-
erence shield law provisions. Part IV critiques these laws and proposes
that legislatures adopt "disclosure-shield" statutes. These statutes would
combine the principles of qualified immunity (as incorporated into exist-
ing reference shield statutes) with a limited affirmative duty to disclose
any incidents of workplace violence engaged in by an employee for whom
a reference is sought.
I. Two TRENDS IN THE 1990S WORKPLACE: No COMMENT" JOB REFERENCE
POLICIES AND THE INCREASING INCIDENCE OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
Until the 1980s, employers could count on receiving references for
prospective employees. 28 References were a routine and traditional feature
of gathering information about potential hires. 29 Employers freely ex-
26 This Article focuses on the problems of "no comment" references regarding employees who
have engaged in violent conduct in the workplace. While I acknowledge the general problem of
declining employer references, this Article concerns what I believe to be the most crucial problem
posed by "no comment" references, that is, silence regarding workers who pose a danger of violent
harm to others. In addition, the proposal in this Article focuses on violent conduct but does not
include misconduct such as theft, embezzlement, dishonesty, or similar issues that result in primar-
ily economic losses. In my view, the case for imposing a duty to disclose is far more compelling
when the potential harm is personal injury rather than an economic loss.
27 For the perspectives of scholars examining the general issue of "no comment" references and
reform proposals, see generally Adler & Peirce, supra note 9; Saxton, supra note 9; Long, supra
note 24; Janet Swerdlow, Note, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer Liability, 64
S. Cal. L. Rev. 1645 (1991).
28 Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Employer (lr)rationality and the Demise of Em-
ployment References, 30 Am. Bus. L.J. 123, 134 (1992) (noting that 1965 through 1969 and 1985
and 1989 were time periods during which employers shifted away from giving detailed employ-
ment references); see also Deborah S. Kleiner, Is Silence Truly Golden?, HRMag., July 1993, at
117 (noting that just two decades ago, few employers had formal reference policies).
29 As one commentator observed in the late 1970s, "[Tihe number of employer references.., has
increased dramatically. References for former employees are now written by the millions." Charles
D. Tiefer, Comment, Qualified Privilege to Defame Employees and Credit Applicants, 12 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 143, 146 (1977). However, even at that time, some employers provided refer-
ences equivalent to today's "name, rank, and serial number" policies, "simply stat[ing] whether the
employee actually worked for them, and if so, for how long and at what job, and other simple ob-
jective information." Id. at 147; see also James W. Fenton, Jr. & Kay W. Lawrimore, Employment
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changed references, oftentimes on an informal basis. 30 The manager pro-
viding the reference had discretion to say whatever he or she thought was
appropriate, with little or no guidance from formal company policies. 31 A
firmly established workplace tradition, references were available "upon
request.
'32
As highly publicized defamation cases received attention in the 1980s,
employers became wary of providing references. 33 Based on the advice of
lawyers and human resource experts, many employers instituted formal
policies limiting the information contained in job references to dates of
employment, job duties, and salary history. 34 In some instances, employers
chose to refrain from providing references altogether.
35
Reference Checking, Firm Size, and Defamation Liability, J. Small Bus. Mgmt., Oct. 1992, at 88
(describing routine reference checks as "a time-honored ritual of employers").
30 Kleiner, supra note 28, at 117 (noting that in the past "references were given on an ad hoc ba-
sis").
31 Id.
32 David Grant, Giving a Reference: Just Name, Rank, and Salary History?, Legal Times, Nov.
30, 1987, at 16 ("It has been traditional in the American workplace for employers to request and
provide employee job references."); see also Tiefer, supra note 29, at 146 (stating that the number
of employment references has increased dramatically "[o]ver the last two centuries").
33 See James G. Frierson, Preventing Employment Lawsuits: An Employer's Guide to Hiring,
Discipline, and Discharge 229-30 (BNA 1995). Frierson observes a "significant trend" since the
1980s of employers refusing to give references or restricting references to job title and time of
employment and observes that the trend "is, in large part, an overreaction to some successful defa-
mation lawsuits against companies thiat gave bad references." Id. at 229 (referring specifically to
the $1.9 million verdict in Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 687 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), as
the catalyst that ignited the limited reference trend).
34 Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their "No Comment"
Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1381, 1386
(1996) (observing that employers have adopted nondisclosure policies "in hopes of avoiding costly
lawsuits"); Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of
"Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for Reform, 13 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 45, 47-48 (1995) (noting
that lay press and attorneys consistently link the widespread use of "no comment" reference poli-
cies with employers' "negative perceptions of the current legal environment"); Valerie L. Acoff,
Note, References Available on Request... Not!-Employers Are Being Sued for Providing Em-
ployee Job References, 17 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 755, 770 (1994) (attributing the proliferation of "no
comment" or "no reference" policies to "[tihe rapidly increasing threat of litigation arising out of
employment references"); Grant, supra note 32, at 16 (asserting that "[tihe increase in employ-
ment-related defamation actions is the single most important reason why many employers now
only grudgingly disclose information about former employees."); Martha Middleton, Employers
Face Upsurge in Suits over Defamation, Nat'l L.J., May 4, 1987, at I (attributing chilling effect on
exchange of information between employers to threat of litigation and expense of defending
claims). But see Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 28, at 140-41 (acknowledging that employers
perceive a threat of defamation liability but arguing that employers' reluctance to provide refer-
ences is based on misinformation and biased perceptions).
35 For example, in a 1989 survey, what is now the International Association of Corporate and
Professional Recruiters found that approximately 41 percent of respondents worked for companies
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 5:2
The following advice from human resource management texts is typi-
cal of the 1990s approach to job references:
Always take a conservative approach with potential em-
ployers. Adopt a policy of simply confirming the facts of
employment, dates, duties, and positions held. The more
derogatory information you supply a prospective employer
(such as "The ex-employee is not eligible for re-hire be-
cause.. ."), the greater the chance you will face a defama-
tion lawsuit. Remember, bad references lead to expensive
lawsuits !36
The safest policy for an employer to follow is to provide
only a statement of fact that the former employee was em-
ployed [for a certain time period] ... without any comment
regarding the quality of the employment or whether or not
the individual was fired or left voluntarily.
37
The increasing difficulty of obtaining references is well documented.
In 1988, the Bureau of National Affairs ("BNA") conducted a survey ex-
amining employee recruiting and selection procedures. 38 BNA reported
that 20 percent of the responding firms found it difficult to obtain or con-
firm "any information beyond simple factual data about a job applicant.
' 39
with written policies that explicitly prohibit providing outsideoreferences. Saxton, supra note 34, at
47 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Corp. and Prof'l Recruiters, Inc., Fourth Annual Membership Survey
Results (1989)). More recent surveys by the Association have not included data on reference poli-
cies. Id. In a 1995 survey by the Society for Human Resource Management ("SHRM"), 38 percent
of respondents agreed that "human resource professionals should refuse to provide job-related
information to prospective employers, even if the information is honest and factual." Society for
Human Resource Management, Reference Checking Leaves Employers in the Dark: Legal Con-
cers a Stumbling Block, SHRM Survey Says (News Release, June 26, 1995) [hereinafter "SHRM
News Release"]; see also SHRM, Reference Checking Survey (1995) [hereinafter "SHRM Refer-
ence Survey"].
36 Steven Mitchell Sack, From Hiring to Firing 297 (1995). In summarizing strategies for reduc-
ing defamation claims, Sack emphasizes this advice, recommending that employers "[a]void giving
negative references to prospective employers." Id. at 305.
37 Cliff Roberson, Hire Right/Fire Right: A Manager's Guide to Employment Practices that
Avoid Lawsuits 39 (1992).
38 Recruiting and Selection Procedures, Personnel Policies Forum Survey No. 146 (BNA), May
1988.
39 Id. at 24. In addition, 68 percent of respondents reported generally that some types of informa-
tion were difficult to obtain. Thirty-one percent noted difficulty obtaining performance appraisals,
while 18 percent reported difficulty ascertaining why an applicant had left a previous job. An un-
specified percentage indicated experiencing problems confirming "salary data, personality infor-
mation, attendance records, and rehire eligibility status." Id.
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In surveys conducted just a few years later, the number of respondents
reporting difficulty in obtaining reference information from other employ-
ers increased dramatically.40 In a 1993 survey by the independent research
firm Robert Half International, 75 percent of responding executives re-
ported that companies were providing less information about former em-
ployees than they had three years earlier.41 In addition, 68 percent of re-
spondents reported that reference checking had become more difficult.
42
Discussing the survey results, Max Messmer, chairman and chief execu-
tive officer of Robert Half International, identified a link between restric-
tive job reference policies and employers' concerns about being sued.
43
Mr. Messmer concluded, "[O]ur litigious society is increasingly forcing
former employers into taking a position of 'no comment' beyond verifica-
tion of employment dates and salary."
44
A 1995 survey by the Society for Human Resource Management
("SHRM") reported similar results. 45 In that survey, 63 percent of respon-
dents reported that they or members of their organization's human re-
sources staff had refused to provide information regarding a former em-
ployee out of fear of a lawsuit.4 6 In addition, 17 percent reported that their
companies had been challenged by a disgruntled former employee over an
40 Robert Half Int'l, Inc., Survey Shows Employers Find It Harder to Check References (Press
Release, Jan. 1993) (poll of 200 Fortune 1000 executives); SHRM Reference Survey, supra note
35. But see Fenton & Lawrimore, supra note 29, at 92-93. In their research, Fenton and Lawrimore
found that the willingness to provide references varied by size of the company:
Results from this research, addressing a firm's willingness to provide past em-
ployee work reference information, clearly show differences between small
versus large business. The results of this research indicate that large firms are
very cautious in sharing past employee information. This may be explained by
the presence of Human Resource Management expertise, which is associated
more with large business. These individuals are versed in the law of defama-
tion and are likely to exercise greater caution in behalf of the firm in respond-
ing to employment reference check requests.
Id. (citation omitted).
41 Robert Half Int'l, Inc., supra note 40, at 2. Nine percent of the 200 hundred Fortune 1,000
executives surveyed reported that companies were providing more information, while 10 percent
perceived no change. Id. at 3.
42 Id. at 1, 3 (finding that 10 percent of respondents said reference checking had become easier,
and 17 percent reported no perceived change).
43 Id. at 2.
44 Id.
45 SHRM attempted to poll a random sample of 5,000 SHRM members who identified them-
selves as working "in the employment function." SHRM received 1,331 responses. SHRM News
Release, supra note 35.
46 Id.
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allegedly inaccurate reference.47 When asked "should HR professionals
refuse to provide job-related information to prospective employers, even if
it is honest and factual?," 38 percent of the respondents answered "yes.
48
Ironically, although a substantial number of the respondents embraced
policies of silence, they also noted the importance of reference checking.
Seventy-three percent agreed that "[i]n seeking to hire the best possible
employees,.., reference checking... [has] become more important now
than in the past."'49
This response reflects the tension between employers' defensive no-
reference strategies and the need for meaningful exchange of reference in-
formation. However wise a strategy to avoid litigation, "name, rank, and
serial number" and "no comment" reference policies hamper employers'
efforts to obtain information about prospective employees. At a minimum,
refusing to provide reference information inhibits the flow of workplace
communication. Employers face roadblocks that prevent them from ob-
taining meaningful information about prospective employees. Employees
suffer as well. "No comment" and "name, rank, and serial number" refer-
ence policies hamstring excellent workers who deserve-but cannot ob-
tain-positive references from their employers. 50 Finally, such policies
neutralize employers' efforts to screen job candidates, thereby increasing
the likelihood that employees will be forced to work with incompetent or
dangerous colleagues. 51
When a job applicant has engaged in violent conduct in his or her pre-
vious workplace, the former employer's fear of lawsuits and the resulting
difficulty prospective employers have obtaining information can have
dangerous consequences. From headline-making murders to unreported
violent altercations and attacks, workplace violence is a serious problem.
In a 1993 survey conducted by SHRM, 32 percent of respondents reported
that since 1989, at least one act of violence had occurred where they
worked. 52 More than one-third of the violent incidents occurred after
1991. 53 A 1994 survey conducted by the American Management Associa-
47 Id.
48 Id. (emphasis added).
49 Id.
50 Richard C. Reuben, Employment Lawyers Rethink Advice, A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 32 (ob-
serving that the "name, rank and serial number" approach to references "punishes good employees
who deserve the benefit of a positive referral").
51 Negligence, Defamation Claim Dangers Are Assessed at BNA IER Conference, 213 Daily Lab.
Rep. A-3, A-4 (BNA) (Nov. 5, 1987).
52 SHRM News Release, supra note 35, at 2.
53 Id.
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tion reported similar results. Nineteen percent of respondents reported
having experienced at least one incident of actual violence and an addi-
tional 33 percent experiencing threatened violence in the workplace since
1990.5 4 Coworkers and supervisors were responsible for 27 percent of the
workplace attacks and 37 percent of the threats of physical harm. 55
Notwithstanding the increasing prevalence of workplace violence, 54
percent of managers responding to the 1995 SHRM survey stated that the
information they received about violent behavior was inadequate. 56 With
an estimated more than two million physical attacks and an additional six
million workers threatened with physical harm every year,57 employers,
policymakers, and the public are demanding a response to the risk of
workplace violence. Former employers obviously are in the best position
to advise prospective employers about employees' past violent conduct in
the workplace, and to do so at relatively low cost. It is imperative that the
legal system encourages them to act, and protect them when they do so.
II. SILENCE MADE GOLDEN: POTENTIAL COMMON LAW TORT LIABILITY
RELATING To UNFAVORABLE JOB REFERENCES
Both employers and employees perceive the workplace as a litigious
environment. With the reported surge in the incidence of lawsuits in the
1980s, workplace defamation gained attention as a real and perceived
threat to employers. 58 Well publicized news accounts of multimillion dol-
lar verdicts exacerbate employers' fears about lawsuits by employees, li-
ability for exorbitant judgments, and the large costs of defending frivolous
54 Am. Mgmt. Ass'n, Workplace Violence: Policies, Procedures, & Incidents, Summary of Key
Findings (65th Annual Human Resources Conference Onsite Survey), Apr. 9-13, 1994 (surveying
500 human resource managers working in private sector companies).
55 Fear and Violence in the Workplace: A Survey Documenting the Experience of American
Workers (Northwestern National Life Ins. Co.), 1993, at 11 [hereinafter "Fear and Violence"]. This
study surveyed 600 private sector workers, excluding business owners and sole proprietors. Id. at
2.
56 SHRM News Release, supra note 35.
57 Fear and Violence, supra note 55, at 2 (survey findings for the period July 1992 to July 1993).
58 This perception may be skewed. Commentators have observed that reports of large jury ver-
dicts may have created an exaggerated fear of liability among employers. See James G. Frierson,
Preventing Employment Lawsuits: An Employer's Guide to Hiring, Discipline, and Discharge 229-
30 (BNA 1995); see also Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Employer (ir)rationality and
the Demise of Employment References, 30 Am. Bus. L.J. 123, 140-41 (1992) (arguing that em-
ployers' fears of reference-based defamation claims may be driven by media reports of large jury
awards and that employers do not hear of smaller awards or awards that are reduced or reversed on
appeal).
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claims.59 Concurrently, media reports create incentives for employees to
bring lawsuits alleging real and perceived wrongs by employers. Employ-
ees typically bring lawsuits against employers for wrongful termination.
60
Alternatively, if an employee receives a negative job reference without
being fired, the reference alone may provide sufficient grounds to establish
tort liability.61 When an employee is precluded from a job opportunity as a
result of an unfavorable reference, he or she may sue the reference giver,
alleging defamation 62 or interference with prospective contractual rela-
tions.63
59 See, e.g., Sigal Constr. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204 (D.C. 1991) (upholding plaintiff's
remitted award of $250,000 for a defamation claim); Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d
612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (awarding plaintiff $1.9 million in defamation claim); see also Roger B.
Jacobs, Defamation and Negligence in the Workplace, 40 Lab. L.J. 567, 571 (1989) (observing that
between 1980 and 1989 there were forty workplace defamation awards exceeding $1 million);
John Bruce Lewis et al., Defamation in the Workplace: A Survey of the Law and Proposals for
Reform, 54 Mo. L. Rev. 797, 798 (1989) (noting that "[vlerdicts of more than $1 million in these
cases are not unusual and some verdicts have reached as high as $6 million"); Gregory Strichar-
chuk, Fired Employees Turn the Reason for Dismissal into a Legal Weapon, Wall St. J., Oct. 2,
1986, at 33 (citing $112,000 as the average amount of damages awarded in cases where the former
employee received a favorable jury verdict). But see Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 58, at 140-41
(arguing that although large jury verdicts tend to receive attention, employers are unaware of the
final outcome of cases after appeal, remittitur or new trial, where jury awards are reduced, and that
cases where plaintiffs lose or receive small awards "may be forgotten or discounted").
60 See, e.g., Sigal, 586 A.2d at 1206 (statements describing project manager as "detail oriented to
the point of losing sight of the big picture" and commenting that "[w]ith a large staff [he] might be
a very competent [project manager]"); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255
(Minn. 1980) (noting description of plaintiff as "a poor salesperson" who was "not industri-
ous[,] ... would not get products out, was hard to motivate and could not sell").
61 See Ronald M. Green & Richard J. Reibstein, Employer's Guide to Workplace Torts 63 (1992)
(noting that defamation claims arise "in a broad range of employment-related matters, includ-
ing... terminations [andl post-employment references"); Martha Middleton, Employers Face Up-
surge in Suits over Defamation, Nat'l L.J., May 4, 1987, at 1 (observing that "defamation actions
are being attached to or are taking the place of wrongful discharge suits"); Gabriella Stem, Com-
panies Discover that Some Firings Backfire into Costly Defamation Suits, Wall St. J., May 5,
1993, at BI (noting that "[1]awyers say more ex-employces are using defamation suits to fight fir-
ings").
62 Numerous commentators have written about defamation claims based on references. See, e.g.,
Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their "No Comment"
Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1381, 1393-1412
(1996); James W. Fenton, Jr. & Kay W. Lawrimore, Employment Reference Checking, Firm Size,
and Defamation Liability, J. Small Bus. Mgmt., Oct. 1992, at 88; Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging
Defense of the Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 Tex. L. Rev.
1693, 1714-26 (1996); Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References:
Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for Reform, 13 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 45, 69-73
(1995); Edward R. Horkan, Note, Contracting Around the Law of Defamation and Employment
References, 79 Va. L. Rev. 517, 520-26 (1993); see generally Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 58;
Robert A. Prentice & Brenda J. Winslett, Employee References: Will a "No Comment" Policy
Protect Employers Against Liability for Defamation? 25 Am. Bus. L.J. 207 (1987); David Grant,
Giving a Reference: Just Name, Rank, and Salary History?, Legal Times, Nov. 30, 1987, at 16;
Deborah S. Kleiner, Is Silence Truly Golden?, HRMag., July 1993, at 117; Workers Refused Jobs
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A. Defamation
An employee who wishes to sue based on a negative job reference
most likely will choose to bring a defamation claim. 64 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts ("Restatement") identifies the elements of a cause of ac-
tion for defamation:
To create liability for defamation there must be:
a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and
d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of spe-
cial harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication. 65
A reference that imputes the commission of a crime or impugns the em-
ployee's ability or fitness for work is considered defamatory. 66 Conse-
Due to Bad References Winning Suits Against Ex-Employers, Lawyer Says, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) (Apr. 3, 1990), at A-3.
63 See, e.g., Adler & Peirce, supra note 62, at 1412-14; Green & Reibstein, supra note 61, at 162-
64; Saxton, supra note 62, at 64-65.
64 Journalists and academic commentators have noted a rising number of workplace defamation
claims. See generally Richard J. Larson, Defamation at the Workplace: Employers Beware, 5 Hof-
stra Lab. L.J. 45 (1988); Lewis et al., supra note 59, at 798; David C. Martin & Kathryn M. Bartol,
Potential Libel and Slander Issues Involving Discharged Employees, 13 Employee Rel. L.J. 43
(1987); David Yulish & Brian Heshizer, Defamation in the Workplace, 40 Lab. L.J. 355 (1989);
Ann M. Barry, Comment, Defamation in the Workplace: The Impact of Increasing Employer Li-
ability, 72 Marq. L. Rev. 264 (1989); Laurence Shore, Comment, Defamation and Employment
Relationships: The New Meanings of Private Speech, Publication, and Privilege, 38 Emory L.J.
871 (1989); Grant, supra note 62, at 16; Arlen W. Langvardt, Defamation in the Business Setting:
Basics and Practical Perspectives, Bus. Horizons, Sept./Oct. 1990, at 66; Tamar Lewin, Boss Can
Be Sued for Saying Too Much, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1987, at B26; Robbin T. Sarrazin, Defama-
tion in the Employment Setting, Tenn. B.J., May/June 1993, at 18; Stern, supra note 61, at BI;
Stricharchuk, supra note 59, at 33. But see Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 58, at 123 (determin-
ing that the relative number of defamation claims probably has not increased, employees seldom
recover, and the size of recoveries has declined, based on a survey of reported workplace defama-
tion cases between 1965-1970 and 1985-1990).
According to some estimates, workplace defamation claims account for approximately one-
third of all defamation suits. Lewis, supra note 59, at 798; Stricharchuk, supra note 59, at 33. Of
course, not all such claims are successful, and appellate courts reverse many plaintiffs' verdicts.
See 0. Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facilitating the Flow of Truthful Personnel Information: Some
Needed Change in the standard Required to Overcome the Qualified Privilege to Defame, 26 Am.
Bus. L.J. 305, 318.
65 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977) [hereinafter "Restatement"].
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quently, a former employer who cautions a prospective employer about an
employee's violent conduct may expose itself to a defamation claim be-
cause the conduct may be criminal, and certainly impugns the employee's
fitness for employment.
Under certain circumstances, an employer will not be held liable. For
example, an employer will escape liability if the employee consented to
the reference, typically by signing a release. 67 In contrast, the defenses of
truth and qualified privilege provide limited protection for employers.
Truth, for example, is a jury question and is difficult to prove:
68
[T]he facts surrounding the basis of the defamatory state-
ment-whether a dismissal or resignation-are rarely free
of dispute. If the facts are debatable in the least, the em-
ployee may allege defamation, and "[e]ven if the employer
is correct and the statements made in the job reference are
true, juries tend to be more sympathetic toward the plaintiff
('the little guy') and not the employer. '69
Similarly, the common law qualified or conditional privilege is not a
reliable safe harbor. Generally, the privilege protects references given by
former employers to prospective employers. Because the privilege is quali-
fied or conditional, the reference provider loses the protection if he or she
abuses the privilege. Employers, likely to be concerned about how a jury
may view their conduct in hindsight, 70 may accordingly opt for the safer
policy of silence.
66 See William J. Holloway & Michael J. Leech, Employment Termination: Rights And Reme-
dies 245-46 (2d ed. 1993).
67 Restatement, supra note 65, §§ 581A, 583, & 593. Although an employee may sign a release
authorizing the employer to provide reference information, a release is not necessarily a guarantee
that the employer will be protected from defamation liability if the information released is false and
defamatory. For example, the court in Kellums v. Freight Sales Centers, Inc., 467 So.2d 816, 817
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), found that the release was unenforceable because public policy pre-
cludes a party from absolving itself from tortious conduct.
68 Markita D. Cooper, Between a Rock and a Hard Case: Time for a New Doctrine of Compelled
Self-Publication, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 373, 436 (1997) (quoting Lewis v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Co., 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 1986) ("[T]he issue of truth raises thorny factual questions,
to be resolved by the jury. A court will uphold the jury's determination unless it 'is manifestly and
palpably contrary to the evidence."')).
69 Adler & Peirce, supra note 62, at 1403 (footnote omitted) (quoting Valerie L. Acoff, Note,
References Available on Request ... Not!-Employers Are Being Sued for Providing Employee
Job References, 17 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 755, 760-61 (1994)).
70 William L. Kandel, Current Developments in the Law, Workplace Dishonest and Security:
Precautions About Prevention, 16 Empl. Rel. L.J. 79, 86-87 (1990) (observing that qualified
privilege provides "no relief" for employers because the "privilege still leaves the door open for
judges and juries to decide whether the statements were truthful and lacking 'malice"').
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B. Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations
In addition to defamation, aggrieved employees may allege interfer-
ence with prospective contractual relations. 71 Generally, interference is not
raised as an independent cause of action; rather, it is combined with defa-
mation or other bases of liability. 72 To establish a prima facie case of inter-
ference with prospective contractual relations, a plaintiff must establish the
following elements:
(1) a relationship between the plaintiff and a third party
with the probability of future economic benefit;
(2) knowledge of this relationship by the defendant;
(3) intentional and improper interference by the defendant
to prevent the relationship from maturing; and
(4) resulting damage.73
In the context of employment references, the claim typically arises
when a prospective employer decides against hiring the plaintiff after re-
ceiving an unfavorable reference from a previous employer. Generally, the
plaintiff's employment prospect must have been "clearly within the grasp
71 This tort is also known as interference with prospective economic advantage. See Anderson v.
Vanden Dorpel, 667 N.E.2d 1296, 1299 (111. 1996).
72 See, e.g., Delloma v. Consolidation Coal Co., 996 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1993) (combining
interference claim with other unspecified causes of action that were dismissed before appeal);
Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Service, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 490 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (combining
interference claim with wrongful discharge claim); Marshall v. Brown, 190 Cal. Rptr. 392, 394
(Cal, Ct. App. 1983) (combining interference claim with causes of action for slander and misrepre-
sentation); Stelzer v. Carmelite Sisters, 619 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (combining
interference and slander with a business expectancy); Geyer v. Steinbronn, 506 A.2d 901, 904 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1986) (combining interference and defamation).
73 Mark A. Rothstein et al., Employment Law § 9.17 (1994); see also, Restatement, supra note
65, § 766B. Courts have used variations of this formula in stating elements of the cause of action in
cases based on unfavorable job references. See, e.g., Anderson, 667 N.E.2d at 1299 (describing the
following elements: "(1) a reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship, (2)
the defendant's knowledge of the expectancy, (3) an intentional and unjustified interference by the
defendant that induced or caused a breach or termination of the expectancy, and (4) damage to the
plaintiff resulting from the defendant's interference"); Stelzer, 619 S.W.2d at 767 (describing the
following elements: "(1) a contract or a valid business relationship or expectancy; (2) the defen-
dant's knowledge of the contract or relationship; (3) defendant must intentionally interfere and
induce or cause a breach of the contract or relationship; (4) the absence of justification; and (5)
defendant's conduct must result in damages"); Geyer, 506 A.2d at 910 (stating that plaintiff bears
burden of establishing "a) the existence of a proper prospective contractual relationship between
the plaintiff and a third party, b) the defendant must act for the purpose of causing the specific type
of harm to plaintiff, c) the act must be unprivileged, and d) actual harm must result").
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law
of the employee absent the negative reference." 74 The typical plaintiff ei-
ther received a job offer contingent upon a reference check or the reference
check was the only step needed before the prospective employer extended
an offer of employment.
Under the traditional approach to interference with prospective con-
tractual relations, the defendant bears the burden of justifying his or her
actions, or demonstrating that the conduct was privileged. Many jurisdic-
tions have shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff, thereby requiring the
plaintiff to show as a part of his or her prima facie case that the defen-
dant's interference was unjustified. 75 Courts' interpretations of what con-
stitutes improper motive vary. For some courts, hostile motive or ill will
may be relevant to proving improper, intentional interference, but ma-
levolent motive is not a prerequisite to liability.76 In other courts, interfer-
ence is not privileged if the reference was given in bad faith77 or if the
statements made were not relevant to the subject or purpose of the refer-
ence inquiry. 78 In either case, if there is no evidence that the former em-
ployer acted with improper motive, even if the reference contained false
information, the plaintiff cannot recover for interference with prospective
economic advantage. 79 Interference must be improper as well as inten-
tional.
C. Common Law Qualified Immunity
Generally, employers who provide job references enjoy a qualified or
conditional privilege that insulates them from liability for defamation. 80
74 Adler & Peirce, supra note 62, at 1413; see also Anderson, 667 N.E.2d at 1300 (finding that
plaintiff's progression past initial series of interviews did not by itself constitute reasonable ex-
pectancy of employment).
75 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 130, at 1011 (5th ed. 1984).
76 Rothstein et al., supra note 73, at 295-96 ("While actual malice, in the sense of ill will, spite, or
hostility, generally need not be proven, as a practical matter its presence often affects the justifica-
tion calculus."); see also Scholtes, 548 F. Supp. at 497 ("[Mlalice which would remove the protec-
tion of privilege is not limited to hate, vindictiveness or animosity but may be found in reckless
disregard of the right of another or such conscious indifference to results as could be regarded as
willfully wrong.").
77 See, e.g., Stelzer, 619 S.W.2d at 768.
78 Scholtes, 548 F. Supp. at 497.
79 Turner v. Halliburton Co., 722 P.2d 1106, 1117 (Kan. 1986).
80 Some argue that a similar qualified privilege applies to causes of action for interference with
prospective advantage. For the purposes of this discussion, the primary focus will be defamation
liability. Defamation claims pose the greatest potential litigation threat arising out of a negative
employment reference. See Saxton, supra note 62, at 64 (observing that defamation is "[t]he most
important common law doctrine affecting employer reference practices"). See also discussion supra
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Section 595 of the Restatement describes circumstances under which the
privilege may arise. It provides, in pertinent part:
Protection of Interest of Recipient or a Third Person
1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privi-
leged if the circumstances induce a correct or reason-
able belief that
(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently im-
portant interest of the recipient or a third person,
and
(b) the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a
legal duty to publish the defamatory matter or is a
person to whom its publication is otherwise within
the generally accepted standards of decent conduct.
(2) In determining whether a publication is within generally
accepted standards of decent conduct it is an important
factor that
(a) the publication is made in response to a request
rather than volunteered by the publisher .... 81
Although § 595 does not specifically address employment, Comment i
discusses the application of the privilege in the employment context.
Comment i provides:
Character of servant. Under many circumstances, a former
employer of a servant is conditionally privileged to make a
defamatory communication about the character or conduct
of the servant to a present or prospective employer. The de-
famatory imputations, however, must be made for the pur-
pose of enabling that person to protect his own interests,
and they must be reasonably calculated to do so. Accord-
ingly, only information that is likely to affect the honesty
and efficiency of the servant's work comes within the
privilege .... Imputations that have no connection with the
work that the servant is to perform, or with the position that
note 64 and accompanying text, which cite reports that reference cases account for nearly one-third
of all libel cases and that a plaintiff employee has a 77 percent chance of prevailing in a defamation
suit against her employer.
81 Restatement, supra note 65, § 595.
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he will occupy in the third person's employment, are out-
side the scope of the privilege.
82
Accordingly, the privilege protects a defamatory job reference when
the reference contains information about a prospective employee's work
performance that is relevant to the prospective employer's hiring deci-
sion.8 3 Most jurisdictions follow this approach.8 4 In jurisdictions that con-
form with the Restatement, an employer who provides a defamatory refer-
ence is protected by common law qualified immunity as long as the em-
ployer does not abuse the privilege. An employer will lose the qualified
privilege if the plaintiff proves the referring employer acted with malice
8 5
or communicated the defamatory reference information to persons other
than the prospective employer.8 6 The existence of the qualified privilege is
82 Id., § 595 cmt. i.
83 See, e.g., Gore v. Health-Tex, Inc., 567 So.2d 1307, 1308 (Ala. 1990); Melcher v. Beeler, 110
P. 181, 184 (Colo. 1910); Kellums v. Freight Sales Ctrs., Inc., 467 So.2d 816, 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Kenney v. Gilmore, 393 S.E.2d 472, 473 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Russell v. American
Guild of Variety Artists, 497 P.2d 40, 46 (Haw. 1972); Quinn v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 658
N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995); Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 612,
615 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Haldeman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 98, 103-04 (Iowa
1985); Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 70 (Me. 1991); Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr., 665
A.2d 297, 317 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), cert. denied, 669 A.2d 1360 (Md. 1996); Gonyea v.
Motor Parts Fed. Credit Union, 480 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Baker v. Bhajan, 871
P.2d 374, 378 (N.M. 1994); Rainey v. Shaffer, 456 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983);
Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 563 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Or. 1977); Swanson v. Speidel
Corp., 293 A.2d 307, 309-10 (R.I. 1972); Hett v. Ploetz, 121 N.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Wis. 1963).
84 Adler & Peirce, supra note 62, at 1408-09.
85 Depending on state law, malice may be based on the employer's motivation for providing the
false reference information or the employer's attitude toward the truth or falsity of the information
contained in the reference. Courts focusing on motivation typically define malice as ill will, spite
or improper motive. In states that base malice on the referring employer's attitude toward truth or
falsity of the content of the reference, the courts require the plaintiff to prove that the employer
knew the reference was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. Alternatively,
the standards of some states consider both the referring employer's motivation and attitude toward
the truth or falsity of the information in determining whether or not the employer abused the privi-
lege. See generally Deborah Daniloff, Note, Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for
Declining References and Chilled Communications in the Workplace, 40 Hastings L.J. 687, 708-
711 (1988) (describing qualified privilege standards); Pamela G. Posey, Note, Employer Defama-
tion: The Role of Qualified Privilege, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 469, 487-491 (1989); Donald P.
Duffala, Annotation, Defamation: Loss of Employer's Qualified Privilege to Publish Employee's
Work Record or Qualification, 24 A.L.R.4th 144 (1983).
86 See Restatement, supra note 65, § 604.
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a question of law, unless there is a factual dispute. 87 Whether the employer
abused the privilege is a question of fact.
88
Today's employers are concerned not only about the limited protection
of qualified immunity, defamation liability, and interference with potential
contractual relations, but also with other potential claims arising out of job
references, negative or otherwise.8 9 Former employees may raise claims
under other tort or statutory theories. 90 Even where the plaintiff only
claims defamation, the employer's qualified privilege may provide little
practical protection. Issues of abuse are jury questions, and the standards
regarding abuse of qualified immunity are complex and unclear. However,
the difficulty of identifying a firm standard of qualified immunity has been
identified as a key factor in the growing trend toward "no comment" and
"name, rank and serial number" reference policies.91
87 See, e.g., Sigal Const. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1213 n.17 (D.C. 1991); Cash v. Em-
pire Gas Corp., 547 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Baker, 871 P.2d at 379; see also Re-
statement, supra note 65, § 619; Keeton, supra note 75, § 115, at 835.
88 See, e.g., Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 790 (Alaska 1989); Dominguez
v. Babcock, 727 P.2d 362, 366 (Colo. 1986). See also Restatement, supra note 65, § 619; Keeton
supra note 75, § 115, at 835.
89 In addition to the limitations on the circumstances in which qualified immunity can be in-
voked, in jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine of compelled self-publication defamation, an
employer who does not give references may still face defamation liability for communicating a
defamatory explanation for dismissal directly to the employee. The self-publication doctrine does
not require direct communication between the defendant employer and the prospective employer.
Liability may attach even if the statement is communicated to the employee and no one else. See,
e.g., McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Lewis v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889-90 (Minn. 1986). For
detailed analysis of compelled self-publication defamation, see generally Cooper, supra note 68;
Louis B. Eble, Self-Publication Defamation: Employee Right or Employee Burden?, 47 Baylor L.
Rev. 745 (1995); Arlen W. Langvardt, Defamation in the Employment Discharge Context: The
Emerging Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication, 26 Duq. L. Rev. 227 (1988); Deanna J.
Mouser, Self-Publication Defamation and the Employment Relationship, 13 Indus. Rel. L.J. 241
(1991/1992); Howard J. Siegel, Self-Publication: Defamation Within the Employment Context, 26
St. Mary's L.J. 1 (1994).
90 For example, third parties may make claims based on references or inadequate background
checks. In addition, the United States Supreme Court recently recognized that a negative reference
could be the basis for a race discrimination claim under Title VII. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
117 S. Ct. 843, 848-49 (1997).
91 See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 62, at 74, 77 (arguing that inconsistencies in qualified privilege
standards create uncertainty regarding the legal standards governing potential exposure to defama-
tion claims, thereby encouraging "no comment" reference policies); see also Reed & Henkel, supra
note 64, at 318-20 (arguing that malice standards are vague and confusing); Daniloff, supra note
85, at 708-11 (critiquing qualified privilege standards as vague, confusing and unevenly applied);
Posey, supra note 85, at 483-91 (referring to the qualified privilege as "the confused privilege" and
analyzing the myriad standards applicable to qualified privilege).
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III. STATE LEGISLATURES TAKE ACTION:
REFERENCE SHIELD LEGISLATION
As discussed above, many employers have adopted "no comment" or
"name, rank and serial number" reference policies to avoid potential tort
liability. In an effort to break this silent stalemate, and to increase work-
place safety and efficiency, legislators have intervened with reference
shield statutes. 92 Before the 1990s, employers seeking to avoid liability for
their job reference practices looked to the common law qualified and con-
ditional privileges that apply to defamation claims. 93 However, by the
mid-to-late 1990s, a majority of states had enacted some form of reference
shield statute. 94 The following section examines the emerging reference
shield legislation trend.
A. Impetus for Shield Laws and Legislative Intent
Reference shield statutes are intended to promote the increased flow of
information about prospective employees between former and potential
employers. 95 These initiatives are a direct response to efforts by human
resource organizations to raise awareness about workplace violence and
the need to screen out violent employees.96 Well publicized, high-profile
incidents of workplace violence have also spurred legislators to action.
97
92 See, e.g., Jim McKay, Job Reference Roulette, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 6, 1995, at Cl
(observing that a national lobbying effort seeks legislation to provide employers with "greater
flexibility" in obtaining information concerning prospective employees); Francis A. McMorris, Ex-
Bosses Face Less Peril Giving Honest Job References, Wall St. J., July 8, 1996, at BI (stating that
shield laws were "intended to make the workplace safer and more efficient"); States Adopt 'Good
Faith' Employment Reference Laws, Legal Intelligencer, July 3, 1996, at 4, available in LEXIS,
NEWS Library, LGLINT File (quoting Sharon Horrigan, Society for Human Resource Manage-
ment ("SHRM") legislative affairs manager, "[tihe flurry in legislative activity over the last two
years was spurred by employers' fears of being sued for providing truthful job references").
93 See discussion supra Part II, Section A.
94 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text, and discussion infra Part III, Section B.
95 For example, the declaration supporting the Illinois Employment Record Disclosure Act reads:
'The Legislature finds that it is in the public interest to protect from civil actions an employer that
provides truthful, performance-related information about an employee or former employee to an
employment reference inquiry." 745 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 46/5 (West Supp. 1997). See also Robert
S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their "No Comment" Policies
Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1381, 1420 (1996); David
E. Rovella, Laws May Ease the Risky Business of Job References, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at BI.
96 For example, lobbying by SHRM has been a catalyst in the trend toward reference shield leg-
islation. In fact, SHRM proudly claims credit for the proliferation of shield laws. See Bill Leonard,
SHRM Leads Fight for State Reference-Checking Laws, HR News (SHRM Press Release, Oct.
1995). Workplace violence is a key concern for SHRM as it pushes for shield legislation. As
Sharon Horrigan, legislative affairs manager for SHRM observed in 1996, "Last year's surge of
concern about the increasing incidence of violence in the workplace told human resource depart-
ments that we need to screen employees better." Diane Stafford, Taking Fear out of References,
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Advocates of reference shield laws contend that the laws benefit not
only the public generally, but individual employers and employees as well.
Reference shield laws ensure that good employees receive the benefit of
good references 98 and also increase the chances that employers receive
useful information when screening prospective employees.99 More impor-
tantly, reference shield laws facilitate the exchange of information that
may alert prospective employers to job applicants who are incompetent,
potentially violent, or pose other potential problems in the workplace.1 00
B. Shield Law Provisions
The basic thrust of reference shield statutes is to protect employers by
giving them qualified immunity when they provide job references. 10 1 Most
Laws Protect Employers who Give out Information About Former Employees, Kansas City Star,
Feb. 8, 1996, at BI.
97 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
98 See Bill Day, Check Protection, Des Moines Bus. Rec. Aug. 5, 1996, at 4 (quoting an insur-
ance executive lobbying for the legislation: "[W]e're trying to help good employees. You have to
be neutral on everybody, and that's really not fair."); Joanna Sullivan, Bosses Ask for Leeway,
Baltimore Bus. J., Feb. 23, 1996, at 1 (discussing views of shield legislation advocates who believe
employees are harmed because good and bad employees receive similar treatment in references);
Tell the Truth: Encourage Accurate Job References, Montgomery Advertiser (Ala.), Mar. 22, 1996,
at 10A (editorial urging approval of shield bill and deploring "name, rank, and serial number"
references as unfair to good employees who would benefit from references).
99 See Armond Budish, Employers Giving References Protected From Suits, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, Apr. 28, 1996, at 3F (stating that the shield law is "designed to promote accurate reporting
by an employee's previous employers so prospective employers can make well-informed deci-
sions"); Randolph Heaster, Labor Criticizes Bill Governing Ex-Employees, Kansas City Star, Apr.
7, 1995, at BI (discussing criticisms of shield bill and proponents' response that bill will meet
employers' need for certain information about job applicants); Judi Russell, Law Backs Employer
Candor in Job References, New Orleans CityBusiness, July 22, 1996, at 6 (asserting that the shield
law "takes some of the guesswork out of hiring").
100 See Terry Boyd, Mum's the Word on Ex-Employee Job References, Bus. First-Louisville, Oct.
23, 1995, at 1 (describing the role of job references in identifying employees who might potentially
embezzle or defraud a new employer); Tannette Johnson-Elie, Bill Could Ease Fear of Giving Ref-
erences: State Legislation Gives Employers Immunity, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, June 2, 1996, at I
(describing state legislation that would provide employers immunity for disclosing an employee's
history of violence and other workplace problems to potential employers); Christi Parsons, Bosses
Might Tell All About Ex-Workers: Bill Would Protect Them on References, Chi. Trib., May 15,
1996, at I (discussing the job-hopping strategies of violent and incompetent employees).
101 This Article focuses on legislation currently in effect. Additional states are considering or have
considered enacting reference shield legislation. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. For a
detailed survey of shield law provisions, see Alex B. Long, Note, Addressing the Cloud Over Em-
ployee References: A Survey of Recently Enacted State Legislation, 39 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 177
(1997).
The overwhelming majority of statutes provide qualified immunity. The Kansas statute, in ad-
dition to providing qualified immunity for disclosures of general information about an employee,
also provides absolute immunity for certain, specific information. The absolute immunity covers
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statutes set forth a rebuttable presumption that an employer who provides
a reference acts in good faith.102 This presumption protects employers who
act in good faith, even when they provide a negative reference containing
false information. The employee or former employee may rebut the good
faith presumption by establishing a lack of good faith.
The scope of qualified immunity varies by state. Under some statutes,
an employer who knowingly provides false or misleading reference infor-
mation will lose the immunity. 103 In some states, an employer may forfeit
immunity by recklessly providing false reference information. 10 4 Under
typical neutral reference disclosures: 1) date of employment, 2) pay level, 3) job description and
duties, and 4) wage history. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-119a(b) (Supp. 1996). Absolute immunity also
attaches to specified information accessible to the employee, including: 1) written evaluations con-
ducted before departure and available to the employee, and 2) whether the employee was voluntar-
ily or involuntarily released from his or her position and the reasons for the separation. Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 44-119a(c) (Supp. 1996).
102 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1996); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1361.C (West
Supp. 1997); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (1997); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 709(a) (Supp.
1997); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 34-1-4(b) (Supp. 1997); Idaho
Code § 44-201(2) (1997); 745 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 1997); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423(b) (Supp. 1997);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.452(2) (West Supp. 1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 61.A (West
Supp. 1998); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.178 (Michie Supp. 1 1996); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1(c) (Supp.
1997); S.D. Codified Laws § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-105 (Supp.
1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.487(2) (West 1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-113(a) (Michie 1997).
Some statutes formulate the good faith presumption slightly differently. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann.
§ 22-5-3-1(b) (Michie 1997) ("An employer that discloses information about a current or former
employee is immune from civil liability ... unless it is proven ... that the information disclosed
was known to be false at the time the disclosure was made."); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-119a (a) (Supp.
1996) ("[An employer.., who discloses information about a current or former employee to a
prospective employer of the employee shall be qualifiedly immune from civil liability."); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 23:291.A (West Supp. 1997) ("Any employer that.., provides accurate information
about... [an] employee's job performance... shall be immune from civil liability.., provided
such employer is not acting in bad faith."); Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1(2) (1997) ('There is a re-
buttable presumption ... [of] good faith when the employer provides information... at the request
of the prospective employer ... ").
103 See Alaska Stat. § 09.65.160 (Michie 1996); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1361.D (West Supp.
1997); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (1997); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 709(a) (Supp. 1997); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West 1997); Idaho Code § 44-201(2) (1997); 745 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann.
46/10 (West. Supp. 1997); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-5-3-1(b) (Michie 1997); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 23:291.A (West. Supp. 1997); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 1997); Md. Code
Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423(b)(2) (Supp. 1997); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.452(2)(a)
(West Supp. 1997); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 4113.71(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 61.A (West Supp. 1998); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 30.178 (Michie. Supp. 1 1996); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1(c) (Supp. 1997); S.C. Code
Ann. § 41-1-65(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. Codified Laws § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp.
1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1(3)-(4) (1997); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 895.487(2) (West 1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-113(b) (Michie 1997).
104 See Alaska Stat. § 09.65.160(1) (Michie 1996); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1361.D (West Supp.
1997); Idaho Code § 44-201(2) (1997); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423(b)(2) (Supp.
1997); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.452(2)(b) (West Supp. 1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40,
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some statutes, an employer may also lose the immunity if it acts with ma-
licious purpose in providing false reference information. 0 5 Ten states strip
the job reference provider's immunity if the reference violates civil rights
laws. 106 Disclosure of confidential information rebuts the good faith pre-
sumption under some statutes as well. 10 7 Finally, employees in seven
states face a stiff burden of proof when rebutting the good faith presump-
tion; they must prove the employer's bad faith by clear and convincing
evidence. 108
§ 61.A (West Supp. 1998); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. Codified
Laws § 60-4-12(1) (Michie Supp. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-105(4) (Supp. 1997); Utah Code
Ann. § 34-42-1(3)-(4) (1997).
105 See Alaska Stat. § 09.65.160 (1) (Michie 1996); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (1997); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 19, § 709(a) (Supp. 1997); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West 1997); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.71(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1997);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.178 (Michie Supp. 1 1996); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1(c)(3) (Supp. 1997); S.D.
Codified Laws § 60-4-12(1) (Michie Supp. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-105(3) (Supp. 1997);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.487(2) (West 1997); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-113(b) (Michie 1997). The
statutes that use "malicious purpose" or similar language do not define the term. Presumably, mali-
ciousness under the shield statutes echoes common law standards and requires some form of bad
motive, evil intent, or intent to harm the person who is the subject of the reference. See, e.g.,
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980) ("[To demonstrate malice
in a defamation action the plaintiff must prove that the defendant 'made the statement from ill will
and improper motives, or causelessly and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff."'
(quoting McKenzie v. William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 183 N.W. 516, 517 (Minn.
1921))).
106 Alaska Stat. § 09.65.160(2) (Michie 1996) ("presumption of good faith is rebutted upon a
showing that the employer ... disclosed information in violation of a civil right" protected under
state or federal law); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (1997) ("presumption of good faith may be
rebutted upon a showing... that the information disclosed was ... violative of a civil right"); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West 1997) (rescinding qualified immunity of employers who violate any
right protected by the state's civil rights law); 745 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997)
("presumption of good faith ... may be rebutted ... [if] the information [was] disclosed ... in
violation of a civil right"); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1997) ("immunity shall not
apply when the reference information supplied.., violated any civil rights"); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 4113.71(B)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1997) (rescinding an employer's immunity if "the disclo-
sure... constitutes an unlawful discriminatory practice" under state law); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.178
(Michic Supp. 11996) ("presumption of good faith is rebutted upon a showing that the information
disclosed.., violated any civil right" under state law); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1(c)(4) (Supp.
1997) ("presumption of good faith is rebuttable upon a showing ... that the information disclosed
was... [v]iolative of the ... employee's civil rights"); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-105(5) (Supp.
1997) ("presumption of good faith is rebuttable upon a showing ... that the information disclosed
was.., violative of the.., employee's civil fights"); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.487(2) (West 1997)
(stating that the presumption of good faith is rebuttable upon a showing that the employer made the
reference in violation of the state employment discrimination statute).
107 Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 709(a) (Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 34-1-4(b) (Supp. 1997); S.D.
Codified Laws § 60-4-12(2) (Michie Supp. 1997) (defining confidentiality according to state or
federal law).
108 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West 1997); Idaho Code § 44-201(2) (1997); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 26, § 598 (West Supp. 1997); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423(b) (Supp. 1997); S.D.
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The reference shield statutes in Arizona and Ohio are unique. They in-
clude "loser pays" or "fee-shifting" provisions, 10 9 which entitle prevailing
parties to recover the costs of litigating their claims. 10 Proponents argue
that fee-shifting provisions protect employers from frivolous lawsuits."'
For example, one commentator argues that a proposed fee-shifting frame-
work would impose a duty of mandatory disclosure in circumstances
where "employers may be most tempted to retreat to a 'no comment' pol-
icy-i.e., when an honest reference will disclose that the applicant in-
volved poses a risk of injury to others."' "12
Codified Laws § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1(3) (1997); Wis. Star.
Ann. § 895.487(2) (West 1997).
109 The Arizona statute provides that "[a] court shall award court costs, attorney fees and other
related expenses to any party that prevails in any civil proceeding in which a violation of [the ref-
erence shield law] is alleged." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1361.1 (West Supp. 1997) (emphasis
added). Compare the Ohio law, which provides that the "loser pays" provision applies only for the
benefit of prevailing employers. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.71(C) (Anderson Supp. 1996). The
Ohio statute reads:
If the court finds that the verdict of the jury was in favor of the defendant, the
court shall determine whether the lawsuit.., constituted frivolous con-
duct .... If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the lawsuit
constituted frivolous conduct, it may order the plaintiff to pay reasonable at-
torney's fees and court costs of the defendant.
Id.
110 Such provisions contrast with the typical "American rule" under which parties pay their own
costs of litigation. See Adler & Peirce, supra note 95, at 1461-62; Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the
Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for Re-
form, 13 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 45, 76, 99 (1995).
111 See, e.g., Catherine Candisky, "Loser Pay" Amendment Won't Stay in House Bill, Columbus
Dispatch (Ohio), Mar. 12, 1995, at 4B (discussing legislative debate concerning "loser pays" pro-
vision in Ohio shield law and reporting that the sponsor of the legislation, State Rep. Bill M. Har-
ris, "said his intent was to protect business owners like himself from frivolous employee law-
suits"); see also Saxton, supra note 110, at 99 & n. 162 (arguing that fee shifting in litigation based
on unfavorable employment references will "discourage plaintiffs from filing marginal claims").
112 Saxton, supra note 110, at 106-107. Saxton proposes a fee-shifting rule that would permit a
prevailing party to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in litigating a claim
based on a job reference. According to Saxton, fee-shifting will encourage employers to provide
references "because plaintiffs bringing unwarranted claims against employers may be required to
reimburse the employer for the fees incurred" to defend the claim. Id. at 102-103 (emphasis
added). Although Saxton contends that fee-shifting will provide incentives for employers to pro-
vide references, this author remains unconvinced that "loser pays" provisions will have the effect
that Saxton predicts. Because most plaintiffs will be unlikely to have the financial resources to pay
the attorneys' fees and costs incurred by defendant employers, it seems unlikely that employers
will take much comfort in the slim possibility that the they will recover costs of litigation. Moreo-
ver, many employers will remain concerned about the non-economic costs of litigation: morale,
time, productivity and disruption. These costs cannot be reimbursed through a fee-shifting ar-
rangement. Regardless of the merits of the fee-shifting concept, Saxton recognizes a critical policy
objective: to encourage employers to discontinue their use of "no comment" reference policies
when asked for references regarding violent employees.
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As a general proposition, the twenty-nine existing reference shield
statutes should ease employers' concerns about job reference-related liti-
gation risks. 1 3 The statutes do not, however, do enough to encourage em-
ployers to disclose cases of violent workplace conduct. In the absence of a
legally imposed, mandatory duty to disclose violent workplace behavior,
employers may refrain from responding to a reference inquiry, even when
a simple, honest disclosure could reduce the potential for devastating
physical harm in the next workplace. Without an obligation to disclose
violent behavior, even the best statutes do not go far enough.
C. Limited Impact of Existing Shield Laws
The long-term impact of reference shield laws remains unclear. Anec-
dotal evidence suggests that, to date, such legislative initiatives have fallen
short of encouraging employers to abandon "name, rank and serial num-
ber" reference policies. There appears to be little change in employers'
level of comfort with providing references, even after states have adopted
reference shield statutes.'1 14
In 1991, Florida became one of the first states to enact shield legisla-
tion.115 Notwithstanding several years of legislative protection, reports in-
dicate that many Florida employers remain reluctant to provide refer-
ences. 116 These employers are not convinced that the shield law will pro-
113 For a table listing reference shield laws in effect as of this writing, see Appendix A.
114 Bill Leonard, Reference-Checking Laws: Now What?, HRMag., Dec. 1995, at 57 (noting that
although Florida passed its reference shield law in 1992, most employers still only verify dates of
employment and salary ranges of former employers); see also Ellen Forman, Truth or Conse-
quences: Divulging a Former Employee's Unacceptable Work Performance Can Open a Pandora's
Box for any Company, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale), Jan. 6, 1997, at 3 (noting that even after the
enactment of the Florida shield law, "many companies are still sticking to confirmation of em-
ployment, position, dates of employment and salary").
115 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West 1997).
116 As one commentator observed:
[Tihe standard.., means companies should be able to breathe easier, but they
have been slow to change. Associated Industries of Florida, a lobbying group
representing 6,000 companies that pushed for the [Florida] bill's passage, still
has a better-safe-than-sorry attitude. "To protect ourselves [against litiga-
tion].., we just don't say anything."
Lauren Picker, Job References: To Give or Not to Give, Working Woman, Feb. 1992, at 21 (quot-
ing Jon Shebel, president of Associated Industries of Florida); accord, Leonard supra note 114, at
57 ("Florida passed a fairly comprehensive reference-checking law in [1991]. Yet the policy of
many employers in Florida is still to verify only dates of employment and salary ranges of former
employees.").
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tect them from lawsuits by disgruntled employees. 117 Employers are con-
cemed with minimizing the threat of litigation and its associated costs. 118
Thus, many employers adopt cautious personnel policies to avoid litiga-
tion. In the words of one Florida management lobbyist: "It seems that em-
ployers have been reluctant to test the law... and are reluctant to rewrite
corporate policies, until they see that the law really works. 119 Such reluc-
tance is not limited to employers in Florida. 120 Although the legislation
strives to encourage employers to change their reference policies, the
practical reality may be that "educating employers and getting them to
change their ways is something akin to rerouting the Mississippi River."121
In contrast, other observers believe shield laws are slowly effecting
employer behavior. To support this contention, they point to employment
lawyers who advise employers to disclose an employee's past violent con-
117 See Jeff Richgels, Giving References Has Become a Sticky Wicket, Capital Times (Madison,
Wis.), Feb. 12, 1997, at IC (noting that "while the [Wisconsin reference shieldilaw may prevent
someone from winning a suit it doesn't prevent them from bringing one... [wihich is a big incen-
tive to stick to name, rank and serial number."); see also Forman, supra note 114, at 3
("[Alttorneys say the Florida statute, and others like it, probably haven't achieved the objective of
creating a legal environment where full references can be given honestly... 'It's pretty good legal
protection to win the lawsuit, but it's not protection from being sued."' (quoting Allan Weitzman, a
labor attorney in Boca Raton, Fla.)).
118 As Reed and Henkel observed: "[T]he fear of litigation which leads employers to turn off the
spigot of employee-related information is a reasonable response from the employers' viewpoint.
Litigation itself is an inefficient, costly, time-consuming process. Even when defamation defen-
dants win, they lose, given the resource commitments required by even successful litigation." 0.
Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facilitating the Flow of Truthful Personnel Information: Some Needed
Change in the Standard Required to Overcome the Qualified Privilege to Defame, 26 Am. Bus. L.J.
305, 318 (1988) (citations omitted); see also Markita D. Cooper, Between a Rock and a Hard Case:
Time for a New Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 373, 439 (1997).
119 Leonard, supra note 114, at 57. (quoting Ann Carson, legislative director for the SHRM Flor-
ida state council).
120 See, e.g., Doerner, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, Providing References for Former Employees
Just Got Safer, Okla. Empl. Law Letter, Oct. 1995, available in LEXIS, LEGNEW Library,
NWLTRS File ("Unfortunately, when it is all said and done, neutral references may still be the
safest way to go for Oklahoma employers."); Diana Kunde, Bill Aims to End Silence Over Job
References, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 8, 1996, at 1H ("Even with a protective law, litigation-shy
employers will be slow to change .. "); Steven Oberbeck, Employers Still Cautious About Giv-
ing References: Past is Taboo for Employers Despite Law, Salt Lake Trib., Oct. 6, 1996, at El
(noting that even after enactment of state shield law, "some of Utah's major employers say the fear
of winding up in litigation still puts a chill in efforts to give or gather information about former
workers or prospective employees"); States Adopt 'Good Faith' Employment Reference Laws,
Legal Intelligencer, July 3, 1996, at 4, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, LGLINT File ("Even in
states that have passed employer-immunity laws, fear continues to stop them from giving honest
references.").
121 Leonard, supra note 96.
Beyond Name, Rank, and Serial Number
duct when asked for a reference. 22 Perhaps, over time, increasing numbers
of lawyers and their employer-clients will embrace this approach. 123 How-
ever, if employers can maintain policies of silence without legal ramifica-
tions, many employers will continue to refrain from disclosing.
Another problem with current legislative initiatives is that many em-
ployers may not be aware of their state reference shield law or the extent
of protection provided by the law. For example, proprietors and managers
of smaller businesses are less likely to have access to resources such as
legal newsletters and human resource publications. Similarly, smaller
businesses are less likely to have ongoing relationships with lawyers who
can advise them about the laws and how reference policies could change
as a result. 124 Assuming that some employers who currently are unaware
of shield statutes would change their policies after learning about the stat-
utes, the effectiveness of any significant new legislative initiatives de-
pends on the dissemination of information about the laws in the popular
press, as well as professional and trade journals.
As long as "name, rank and serial number" and "no comment" refer-
ences remain the predominant strategy in the workplace, shield laws can-
not create the environment of open and freely given references for which
they were enacted. To the extent that employers continue to adhere to such
reference policies when asked about violent employees, the legislation's
failure is a resounding and disturbing one. Accordingly, legislatures
should fill the gap with bolder legislative approaches that encourage em-
ployers to share information when prospective employers seek references
for employees who have engaged in violent conduct toward other persons
in the workplace.
122 For example, one news account noted that although shield laws do not require employers to
disclose an employee's past violent behavior, some lawyers advise clients to do so. McMorris,
supra note 92, at BI. In the same article, Garry Mathiason, a San Francisco management lawyer is
quoted: "For the first time, we are saying-with great caution-if there is a safety-sensitive issue,
you should make a disclosure." Id.
123 The effectiveness of reference shield laws perhaps could be measured by a formal, empirical
study of employer reference-giving behavior in states that have shield laws in effect. As of this
writing, no such empirical studies have been conducted regarding reference-giving behavior in
states that have adopted shield laws.
124 As a news report regarding the newly enacted Louisiana shield law noted: "[A]s employers
become more familiar with the law, communication will begin to flow again. But word has been
slow to percolate through offices . . . . 'It's an educational process. The employer community is
just not really familiar with the statute."' Russell, supra note 99 (quoting Warren Privette, a mem-
ber of SHRM in Louisiana). Similarly, news of the enactment of Oregon's reference shield law
appeared in an article summarizing "'lesser known' amendments" to the state's employment laws.
See Perkins Coie, LLP, Summary of Recent "Lesser Known" Amendments to Oregon Laws Af-
fecting Employers, Or. Empl. L. Letter, Oct. 1995, available in LEXIS, LEGNEW Library,
NWLTRS File.
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IV. COMBINING THE SHIELD WITH A LIMITED AFFIRMATIVE DUTY:
MAKING THE CASE FOR DISCLOSURE-SHIELD STATUTES
A. The Case for Legislative Change
If employers consistently apply "no comment" and "name, rank, and
serial number" reference policies as a matter of course, they may avoid
defamation claims. While such bland references yield nothing defamatory,
they also yield little, if any, substantive information to guide prospective
employers. As a result, prospective employers may make poor decisions,.
hiring individuals who are incompetent or have difficulty getting along
with coworkers. The consequences of an inappropriate hire can include
economic losses, lost productivity, decreased efficiency, and lost morale.
The significance of such losses should not be minimized, and many com-
mentators have expressed concern that the decline in references has nega-
tively affected the workplace. 25
In some cases, however, an employer who receives no information
faces consequences beyond those of economics, productivity, and effi-
ciency. These situations involve employees who have engaged in violent
conduct in the workplace, yet whose behavior remains undisclosed under a
"name, rank, and serial number" or "no comment" policy. Because allega-
tions of violent behavior are more likely to give rise to defamation suits, 126
125 See generally James W. Fenton & Kay W. Lawrimore, Employment Reference Checking, Firm
Size, and Defamation Liability, J. of Small Bus. Mgmt., Oct. 1992, at 88; William L. Kandel, Cur-
rent Developments in the Law, Workplace Dishonest and Security: Precautions About Prevention,
16 Empl. Rel. L.J. 79, 83-85 (1990); Valerie L. Acoff, Note, References Available on Request...
Not!-Employers Are Being Sued for Providing Employee Job References, 17 Am. J. Trial Advoc.
755, 770 (1994); Deborah Daniloff, Note, Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for De-
clining References and Chilled Communications in the Workplace, 40 Hastings L.J. 687, 708-711
(1988); Deborah S. Kleiner, Is Silence Truly Golden?, HRMag., July 1993, at 117; Arlen W.
Langvardt, Defamation in the Business Setting: Basics and Practical Perspectives, Bus. Horizons,
Sept. 1990, at 66; Martha Middleton, Employers Face Upsurge in Suits over Defamation, Nat'l
L.J., May 4, 1987, at 1.
126 Of course, truth and qualified privilege would provide defenses to such claims; these defenses,
however, raise factual questions to be resolved by a jury. See supra Part II, Section A. Juries gen-
erally tend to be sympathetic toward the employee plaintiff. Markita D. Cooper, Between a Rock
and a Hard Case: Time for a New Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev.
373, 437-38 (1997); Acoff, supra note 125, at 760-61. Thus, a plaintiff whose case turns on the
resolution of the factual questions of truth or abuse of qualified privilege may have increased lev-
erage for settlement or may be more confident in proceeding through trial. Employers may per-
ceive that unsympathetic jurors will not agree with their assessment of the facts. Consequently, if
there is no legal obligation to disclose information regarding incidents of violence, many employ-
ers are likely to take a conservative approach and remain silent.
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these are "the circumstances in which employers may be most tempted to
retreat to a 'no comment' policy. '1
27
Consider the events leading to the lawsuit in Jerner v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co. 128 In Jerner, Paul Calden engaged in repeated violent and bizarre
behavior while working for Allstate in Tampa, Florida. Calden made death
threats against coworkers, 129 typed a list of coworkers with the word
"blood" written beside their names, 130 "fought bitterly" over a parking
space, 131 and generally frightened coworkers and supervisors with bizarre
and confrontational behavior. 132 Finally, when Calden brought a pistol to
work in his briefcase, 133 Allstate fired him. Although Allstate had a policy
against giving references, Calden received a recommendation letter stating
that he had resigned voluntarily as part of an organizational restructur-
ing.134 The letter did not mention Calden's violent conduct. 35 Calden used
127 Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of "Over-
deterrence" and a Proposal for Reform, 13 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 45, 106 (1995).
128 See Amended Wrongful Death Complaint, at 17, Jerner v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1995)
(No. 93-09472).
129 Vickie Chachere, Documents Detail Gunman's Bizarre Past, Tampa Trib., Aug. 8, 1995, at 1.
130 Linda Gibson, Survivors Can Sue for Failure to Warn, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 21, 1995, at A8.
131 Marty Rosen et al., "I'll Take a Few People With Me," St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 30, 1993, at
11B.
132 For example, Calden refused to participate in a photograph of management trainees, explaining
that his image would not appear in a photograph. He also told coworkers that he came from an-
other planet. Chachere, supra note 129, at 1; Bill Duryea & Marty Rosen, Killer's Character Belied
His Actions, St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 29, 1993, at 1B; Gibson, supra note 130, at A8.
133 Chachere, supra note 129, at 1; Gibson, supra note 130, at A8.
134 Apparently, Calden's supervisor, John Deufel, was alarmed by Calden's behavior and per-
suaded him to resign "with a phony story about corporate restructuring and an offer of extra sever-
ance pay if he quit immediately." Gibson, supra note 130, at A8. Why and how Calden received
the letter remains a mystery. Although Deufel fabricated the restructuring story to induce Calden's
resignation, Deufel denied suggesting that the story be incorporated in a letter of recommendation.
Id.
135 Amended Wrongful Death Complaint, supra note 128, Exhibit A. The letter, addressed "To
Whom It May Concern" read as follows:
RE: PAUL CALDEN
Due to organization [sic] restructuring Paul Calden's position at Allstate Insur-
ance Company has been eliminated.
As a result, Paul Calden has voluntarily resigned to pursue new career oppor-
tunities.
This action is in no way a reflection upon Paul's job performance.
Id. The letter was signed by Catherine S. Brune, Regional Vice President of Allstate's Florida Re-
gional Operations Center. Brune later said she had never heard about any odd behavior by Calden.
Chachere, supra note 129, at 1.
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the recommendation to obtain ajob with Fireman's Fund Insurance. 136 His
confrontational behavior continued at Fireman's Fund and the company
terminated him. 137 Eight months after his termination, Calden walked into
the cafeteria where Fireman's Fund employees ate lunch and methodically
shot five of his former supervisors with 10 blasts from a semiautomatic
handgun. 138 The shooting killed three victims, partially blinded one, and
paralyzed another. 139 According to a Tampa police officer, Calden did not
shoot randomly: "All of the people were the management team who were
involved in his firing.'
140
With a few additional hypothetical facts, Calden's case serves as an
even more chilling example of the potential dangers arising from an em-
ployer's refusal to provide information about an employee's violent be-
havior to a prospective employer. Suppose, for example, that Allstate had
adhered to its policy of refusing to give references. Allstate would have
followed the practice of many employers: giving no reference or providing
only "name, rank and serial number" information. Current law, including
the emerging reference shield laws, would not require Allstate to provide
any information about Calden's behavior to a prospective employer.
141
136 Gibson, supra note 130, at A8.
137 Anne Hull, Victims Sue Gunman's Former Boss, St. Petersburg Times, June 23, 1994 at I B;
Chachere, supra note 129, at 1.
138 Paul de La Garza & Lisa Frederick, Man Kills Three in Tampa Cafe, St. Petersburg Times, Jan.
28, 1993, at IA.
139 Chachere, supra note 129, at 1.
140 Duryea & Rosen, supra note 132, at lB (quoting Tampa police Sgt. Harold Sells); see also de
la Garza & Frederick, supra note 138, at IA.
141 Although the shield laws do not expressly require employers to provide references, some law-
yers have expressed concern that the statutes may create a duty to disclose reference information
upon request. See, e.g., Holland & Hart, New Idaho Law May Impact Employers' Ability to Ref-
use to Give References, Idaho Empl. L. Letter (May 1996), available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
NWLTRS File ("Potentially, the prospective employer who requested but was refused a reference
could bring a lawsuit against the employer who followed a nondisclosure policy and failed to warn
of the employee's criminal behavior."). Cf. Matkov, Salzman, Madoff & Gunn, Employers Can
Now Say "Johnny Was a Bad Performer" Without Fear of Civil Liability, I11. Empl. L. Letter (Aug.
1996) ("Nothing in the Act requires employers to provide employment references that are anything
other than neutral."). The Ohio and Oklahoma statutes expressly state that no new cause of action
is created. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.71.D(1) (Anderson Supp. 1996) ("This section does not
create a new cause of action or substantive legal right against an employer."); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
40, § 61 .C (West Supp. 1998) ("Failure to comply with any provision of this section shall not give
rise to any liability or causes of action which did not exist prior to the effective date of this sec-
tion."). Such language demonstrates that the Ohio and Oklahoma legislatures did not intend the
shield laws to create any affirmative duty that does not exist under the common law.
The shield statute trend is a recent development. As of this writing, there is only one reported
case interpreting a state shield statute. See Steele v. McDonald's Corp., 686 N.E.2d 137 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1997). Plaintiff Steele was a convicted felon who obtained a job at McDonald's restaurant
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Allstate would not have had to disclose that Calden brought a gun to work,
threatened coworkers, or routinely confronted other employees.
Suppose also that Calden's shooting rampage occurred within weeks
after he began working for Fireman's Fund.1 42 Management at Fireman's
Fund would not have had time to observe Calden engage in similar violent
behavior. For Fireman's Fund, as the hiring employer, the best source of
information about Calden's workplace behavior was his former employer,
Allstate. However, under existing law, a former employer is free to say
nothing even when a truthful, factual account would provide information
that could be used to avert or minimize the risk of future violent conduct
by the employee. With access to this information, a prospective employer
could either decline to hire a job applicant with a history of violent be-
havior or hire that person and monitor his or her behavior. Without the in-
formatioi, the hiring employer loses the opportunity to take appropriate
preventive measures.
Existing law provides no incentive for employers to change their be-
havior regarding references. There are no disadvantages to maintaining a
policy of silence when an employer is asked for a reference. Although
some emerging precedents suggest that an employer may be held liable for
misrepresentation for failure to disclose, these cases generally involve an
employer who provides a positive reference without disclosing the em-
ployee's dangerous propensities. The alleged event triggering liability in
this sort of case is not employer silence or neutrality, but rather, references
that include "affirmative misrepresentations" about the employee.
For example, in Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District,43
Robert Gadams allegedly sexually assaulted plaintiff Randi W., a 13-year
and, after being promised strict confidentiality, disclosed his felon status to McDonald's. Id. at
139. Steele was later fired for fighting a coworker in self-defense. Id. at 140. Steele was convicted
of misdemeanor battery based on false testimony by another McDonald's employee. Id. After be-
ing fired by McDonald's, Steele went to work at a Kroger grocery store. Id. He did not disclose his
convicted felon status to Kroger. Id. When an unidentified McDonald's employee informed Kroger
of Steele's felon status, Kroger fired Steele. Id. Steele sued McDonald's for inter alia disclosing
his felon status in violation of the promised confidentiality. Id. Citing the Indiana reference shield
statute contained in Indiana Code § 22-5-3-1(b), the court held that McDonald's was immune from
liability for the truthful disclosure. Id. at 142. However, Steele does not appear to involve an actual
reference given by McDonald's to Kroger as a prospective employer.
142 Calden embarked upon his shooting spree two years and eight months after leaving Allstate.
Because so much time passed between Allstate's reference and Calden's shooting rampage, All-
state could have argued that the reference was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' harm. In
theory, such an approach might have been successful. As a practical matter, however Allstate may
have decided that settlement was a better option given that the lawsuit would inevitably generate
substantial and ongoing negative publicity.
143 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
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old student at the school where Gadams worked as vice-principal. Gad-
ams' previous employer allegedly had provided glowing letters of recom-
mendation without disclosing knowledge of prior charges and complaints
of on-the-job sexual misconduct and impropriety. 144 Emphasizing that the
defendants' letters of recommendation "contain[ed] unreserved and un-
conditional praise for former employee Gadams despite defendants' al-
leged knowledge of complaints or charges of his sexual misconduct with
students," 145 the California Supreme Court concluded that the recommen-
dations "constituted misleading statements that could form the basis for
tort liability for fraud or negligent misrepresentation."' 146 The court also
concluded that under the circumstances alleged, the representations con-
stituted "misleading half-truths,"'147 and invoked the exception to the gen-
eral rule against liability for nondisclosure or failure to act. 148 Explaining
that the facts alleged demonstrated more than mere failure to disclose, the
court held that recommending employers owe a duty to prospective em-
ployers and third persons, stating:
Although policy considerations dictate that ordinarily a
recommending employer should not be held account-
able .. . for failing to disclose negative information re-
garding a former employee, nonetheless, liability may be
imposed if, as alleged here, the recommendation letter
amounts to an affirmative misrepresentation presenting a
foreseeable and substantial risk of physical harm to a third
person. 14 9
The Randi W. opinion emphasizes the affirmative nature of the alleged
misrepresentations in Gadams' recommendation. Randi W. requires an
employer who provides a positive reference about an employee also to
disclose, where the employer has actual or constructive knowledge, infor-
mation about the employee's dangerous conduct. The case does not
change the legal effect of the typical "name, rank and serial number" ref-
erence. The court acknowledged that the defendant school district would
not have been liable had it provided only a "no comment" recommenda-
tion or merely verifying dates of employment and similar "name, rank, and
144 Id. at 585.
145 Id. at 584.
146 Id.
14 7 Id. at 591.
148 Id. at 592-93.
149 Id.
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serial number" information concerning Gadams. 150 The court also pointed
out that neither case law nor the Restatement "suggest that a former em-
ployer has an affirmative duty of disclosure that would preclude such a 'no
comment' letter."' 51 Accordingly, the district would have had no legal ob-
ligation to disclose the misconduct to prospective employers even if the
school board was aware that Gadams had molested students.
Aside from Randi W., there have been few job reference cases that in-
voke the theory of misrepresentation, and even fewer in which the plain-
tiff's claim has succeeded. In a rare case, Gutzan v. Altair Airlines, Inc., 152
the plaintiff recovered using a negligent misrepresentation theory. In that
case, Joseph Farmer sought a job through Romac & Associates ("Ro-
mac"), an employment agency. 153 Farmer, who had been convicted of rape
while serving in the military in Germany, explained that although he had
been convicted and served time in prison, the conviction was the result of
a military policy to appease foreign women who brought rape charges.
154
No one at Romac verified Farmer's explanation. 155 In reliance on Romac's
assurance that military officials had verified Farmer's explanation of the
rape conviction, Altair hired Farmer. 56 One year later, Farmer raped the
plaintiff, Rosalie Gutzan, an Altair employee.15 7 After the rape, Altair and
Romac learned that Farmer had fabricated the explanation of his rape con-
viction and, further, that he had been convicted of assaulting and raping a
coworker while in the military. 158
150 Id. at 589. Interestingly, amicus curiae in Randi W. invoked California's statutory qualified
privilege-a reference shield law-as a defense to the misrepresentation claims. Id. at 591 (citing
Cal Civ. Code § 47c (West Supp. 1998)). After reviewing the legislative materials submitted with
the amicus brief, the court concluded that the legislature intended the privilege to apply to actions
by former employees rather than to apply as a broad insulation from all tort liability arising from
job references. However, the court went on to point out that even if California Civil Code § 47c
provided a defense to misrepresentation claims by third persons, the shield law or privilege "by its
terms... pertains only to communications made 'upon request of' the prospective employer." Id.
Because the defendants did not claim they wrote the recommendation letter in response to a pro-
spective employer's request, the privilege did not apply. Id.
151 Id.
152 766 F. 2d 135 (3rd Cir. 1985).




157 Id. at 138.
158 Id.
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Plaintiff sued Altair and Romac. Altair settled plaintiff's claim. The
case against Romac proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of plaintiff Gutzan. 159 However, the jury apportioned only ten per-
cent of the liability to Romac. 160 The trial court denied Gutzan's motions
for a new trial and to have the judgment set aside. 161 On appeal, Gutzan
challenged the jury instructions, arguing that although the jury found that
Romac was negligent, the instructions were not sufficiently specific on the
issue of negligent misrepresentation. 162 The appellate court affirmed the
verdict, noting that "[t]he jury's verdict makes it clear that it understood
plaintiff's position that her injury was caused by Altair's reasonable reli-
ance on Romac's misrepresentations."'
163
The defendants' liability in Gutzan and potential liability in Randi W.
hinged on their disclosures about former employees who attacked others in
a subsequent employer's workplace. However, if an employer refuses to
disclose an employee's violent workplace conduct and makes no partial,
misleading, or negligent disclosures, existing common law and reference
shield statutes immunize the employer from liability to persons injured as
a result of the nondisclosure. Under principles of tort law, courts are re-
luctant to impose affirmative duties, 164 and job disclosure cases remain
faithful to this pattern.
In Cohen v. Wales,165 a child alleged that she had been injured by a
grammar school teacher. 166 The plaintiff sued the teacher's previous em-
ployer, the Warwick School District, alleging that the Warwick District
had recommended the teacher "without disclosing that the teacher had
been charged with sexual misconduct."' 167 In a two-page opinion, the court
affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the complaint. 168 The court held
159 Id.
160 Id. at 137, 140.
161 Id. at 137.
162 Id. at 138.
163 Id. at 139 n.4.
164 Generally, the common law does not impose a duty to control the conduct of another person or
to warn others regarding that person's dangerous conduct. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 314 (1965) (no duty to take action necessary to aid or protect another) [hereinafter "Restate-
ment"l.
165 518 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1987).
166 Presumably, the plaintiff was a student who alleged she was sexually molested by the teacher.
However, the court's opinion is vague on the facts and describes the plaintiff only as "the infant
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that there was no common law duty requiring the previous employer to
warn the new employer of the dangerous conduct "in the absence of a spe-
cial relationship between either the person who threatens harmful conduct
or the foreseeable victim."'
1 69
The court's holding in Cohen is consistent with the common law prin-
ciple that, as a general rule, one does not owe a duty to warn people en-
dangered by a third person's conduct.1 70 Traditional tort law distinguishes
between misfeasance (active misconduct by a defendant), and nonfeasance
(inaction by a defendant), 171 generally imposing liability only for active
misconduct. As seen in Cohen, however, there are exceptions, including
the affirmative duty to act in cases of a "special relationship" between the
defendant and the plaintiff or between the defendant and a dangerous third
person. 1
72
One of the best known cases establishing a duty based on special rela-
tionship is Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.173 In Tara-
soff, Prosenjit Poddar told Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist employed
by the University of California, that he intended to kill Tatiana Tarasoff.
174
Dr. Moore notified the campus police, who briefly detained Poddar and
then released him.175 No one warned Tarasoff of Poddar's threat. 176 Two
months later, Poddar killed Tarasoff.1
77
Tarasoff's mother and father sued several defendants, including Dr.
Moore and other university therapists, alleging inter alia that the defen-
dants failed to warn Tarasoff of the danger. 178 Citing the general common
law rule, the therapists argued that they had no duty to warn Tarasoff.
179
169 Id. at 634. However, even if the court had found a common law duty to warn, it is unlikely that
the plaintiff would have prevailed. The sexual assault at issue occurred 1I years after the teacher
began working for the Tri-Valley School District. Given the time interval between the recommen-
dation and the teacher's alleged assault, the complaint would have failed to prove proximate cause.
170 See Restatement, supra note 164, § 314 (no duty to take action necessary to aid or protect an-
other).
171 W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, at 373-375 (5th ed. 1984);
Restatement, supra note 164, § 314, cmt. c.
172 Restatement, supra note 164, § 315; Keeton, supra note 171, § 56, at 373-375.
173 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
174 Id. at 339.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 340.
177 Id. at 339.
178 Id. at 341-42.
179 Id. at 342.
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The California Supreme Court rejected the therapists' argument. The court
noted an exception to the general rule of no duty where "the defendant
stands in some special relationship to either the person whose conduct
needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that
conduct." 180 In this case, the court found that a special relationship existed
between Poddar-the person whose conduct posed danger-and the thera-
pists, which gave rise to an affirmative duty to take action for the benefit
of Tarasoff, an endangered third person.181
In the absence of a special relationship or some action by the defen-
dant, courts generally refuse to impose affirmative duties to act. Consistent
with this pattern, the court in Cohen v. Wales'8 2 refused to consider the
letter of recommendation as a basis for imposing a duty to warn. The court
stated: "The mere recommendation of a person for potential employment
is not a proper basis for asserting a claim of negligence where another
party is responsible for the actual hiring."' 183
Other cases echo this theme. In Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home,
Inc.,184 Jeffrey St. Clair, an employee of Maintenance Management Corpo-
ration, murdered Clyde Moore, Sr.185 Moore's family members sued St.
Clair's previous employer, St. Joseph Nursing Home, for failure to dis-
close information concerning St. Clair's history of violent conduct.
186
During his employment with St. Joseph Nursing Home, St. Clair received
twenty-four disciplinary warnings for actions, ranging from alcohol and
drug use to "outright violence" in the workplace.1 87 After the nursing
home terminated his employment, St. Clair applied for a position with
Maintenance Management Corporation. St. Clair's job application listed
the nursing home as a former employer. 188 According to the nursing home,
Maintenance Management never contacted it for a reference regarding St.
Clair.' 89 The nursing home asserted that even if Maintenance Management
had asked for a reference, it would nevertheless have disclosed only St.
Clair's dates of employment, despite his record of violent behavior.
180 Id. at 343 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 315-320 (1965)).
181 Id.
182 Cohen v. Wales, 518 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1987).
183 Id. at 634 (citation omitted).
184459 N.W. 2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
185 Id. at 101.
186 Id. at 101-02.
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After Maintenance Management hired St. Clair, he beat and murdered
Moore, a fellow employee. Moore's survivors sued the nursing home, ar-
guing that "a former employer should have a duty to disclose a former
employee's dangerous proclivities" when a prospective employer seeks a
reference.' 90 Plaintiffs attempted to establish the existence of a special re-
lationship, building on the theory of qualified privilege. 191 Arguing that
the privilege was based on a special relationship of moral and social duty
between former and prospective employers, the plaintiffs contended the
privilege required employers to disclose negative information because the
employer could do so without defamation liability.'
92
The court reluctantly affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the nursing home. 193 The court rejected any connec-
tion between granting a privilege to disclose negative information and re-
quiring such disclosure, stating:
There is, however, nothing about the conditional privilege
which magically transposes it into a legal obligation re-
quiring employers to disclose adverse information con-
ceming a former employee. Rather, it is quite clear that in
Michigan, a former employer's duty to release information
about a past employee is an imperfect obligation of a moral





193 Id. at 101.
194 Id. at 102 (emphasis added). To establish a special relationship as basis for the proposed com-
mon law disclosure duty, the plaintiffs in Moore perhaps should have based the special relationship
argument on the nature of the relationship between the former employer and its former employee.
As Janet Swerdlow argues, Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 315 and 317 include the employer-
employee relationship in the category of special relationships. Janet Swerdlow, Note, Negligent
Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer Liability, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1645, 1662 & n.97 (1991).
Swerdlow also argues that, in the employment reference context, the special relationship between
the employer and employee continues after employment terminates because the former employee
has unique information related to the employment. Id. at 1662-1663. See also Saxton, supra note
127, at 94 (arguing that the employer may acquire special knowledge of its employee's dangerous
behavior and traditional common law doctrines would support recognizing a special relationship
on this basis).
Alternatively, the plaintiffs could have maintained their focus on the relationship between the
inquiring prospective employer and the former employer, emphasizing the prospective employer's
dependence on the former employer for information. See Saxton, supra note 127, at 95 (endorsing
Swerdlow's view that prospective employers who request references stand in a relationship of de-
pendence with current or former employers who possess critical information gained through the
working relationship with a violent employee). See also Swerdlow, supra, at 1661-1663.
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The Moore court also expressed concern about society's interest in the
confidentiality of employment records and possible abuse of a disclosure
requirement. Noting that "[i]t is all too easy to envision a career destroyed
by malefic information released by a disgruntled former employer,"'195 the
court saw no reason to expand the qualified privilege to encompass a dis-
closure requirement. The court emphasized that the position advanced by
plaintiffs would be a significant change in the law-one that should be
made by the legislature, not courts. 196 Nonetheless, as it affirmed the grant
of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the court expressed sym-
pathy for the position that information about violent employees should be
disclosed:
Although we agree with the trial court that in today's soci-
ety, with increased instances of child abuse and other types
of violence directed towards readily identifiable classes of
people, we may have reached a point where people should
make this type of information known, we restate our belief
that this is a substantive change in our law, the type of
change best left to our Legislature.197
With the exception of cases of affirmative misrepresentations or half-
truths, the common law remains firmly fixed in the notion that employers
have no duty to disclose information about an employee's violent behavior
in job references. However, serious problems exist beyond the realm of
misleading half-truths and misrepresentations. As Moore suggests, the
legislature is the appropriate entity to create an affirmative legal duty re-
quiring employers to disclose information about violent employees in ref-
erences.
B. Ending the Silence About Violence:
Creating a Disclosure-Shield Model
To address the problem of employer silence, this article proposes that
legislatures enact limited "disclosure-shield" statutes. 198 The proposal
195 Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, 459 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
196 The court noted the Michigan legislature had clearly evidenced its intent to regulate defama-
tion law because the legislature had enacted at least nine statutory provisions relating to libel and
slander. Id.
197 Id. at 103 (emphasis added). However, even if there had been such a duty, the court most likely
would have denied plaintiffs' claims because neither the event nor the identity of the victim was
foreseeable. As the court stated, "Plaintiffs' decedent was the unfortunate and tragic victim of St.
Clair's random violent behavior." Id.
198 See Appendix B for my proposed model disclosure-shield statute.
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builds on the Tarasoff notion of the duty to warn, implicitly recognizing a
special relationship between the reference-providing employer and its
violent employee. 199 The model legislation is tailored to encourage em-
ployers to exchange information about violent employees by combining
existing reference shield immunities with an obligation to provide more
information than "name, rank and serial number" when responding to a
prospective employer. Under the model statute, an employer who receives
a reference request is required to disclose and describe the facts relating to
any violent workplace conduct by that employee. The disclosing employer
is shielded from liability for the disclosure, unless the employer proyides
false information with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard for
the information's truth or falsity. The protection extends to claims by an
employee arising from a negative reference. The statute also protects the
referring employer from claims by hiring employers or other third parties
alleging harm caused by a misleading or inaccurate reference. Finally, the
legislation requires that the referring employer provide a copy of the writ-
ten reference to the employee. This additional step allows the employee to
examine the reference and, as necessary, rebut or explain the information
described in the document.
Noncompliance with the disclosure obligation could lead to tort liabil-
ity. For example, assume Employer A received a reference request from
Employer B regarding an employee who had engaged in violent conduct in
Employer A's workplace. Under the model statute, Employer A has a legal
duty to inform Employer B of the facts surrounding such incidents. Sup-
pose that instead Employer A provided a "no comment," "name, rank, and
serial number" reference or an unconditionally positive reference, and
Employer B hired the employee. If the employee subsequently engaged in
violent conduct that resulted in personal injury to persons in Employer B's
workplace, Employer B and other injured parties could bring a tort action
199 Other commentators build on Tarasoff by proposing reforms of tort law relating to references.
See generally Saxton, supra note 127 (proposing a limited duty of disclosure requiring employers
to respond to reference inquiries and disclose unfavorable characteristics of employees that suggest
the employee poses a potential risk of physical harm to other persons); Swerdlow, supra note 194,
at 1667-73 (proposing a tort of negligent referral requiring employers to provide honest and accu-
rate reference where a job applicant could pose a danger to persons or property). For other discus-
sions recognizing that Tarasoff principles could be extended to employment references, see gener-
ally John Bruce Lewis et al., Defamation in the Workplace: A Survey of the Law and Proposals for
Reform, 54 Mo. L. Rev. 797, 834-35 & n.253 (1989); cf. Ann M. Barry, Note, Defamation in the
Workplace: The Impact of Increasing Employer Liability, 72 Marq. L. Rev. 264, 300-01 (1989)
(discussing "negligent references" theory). For a contrary view, see Robert S. Adler & Ellen R.
Peirce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their "No Comment" Policies Regarding Job Refer-
ences: A Reform Proposal, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1381, 1442-47 (1996) (rejecting the imposi-
tion of a duty to give references, rejecting the tort of negligent referral, and criticizing the use of
Tarasoff as the theoretical foundation for such duties).
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against Employer A. In a claim by the employee alleging that referring
Employer A had falsely informed Employer B that the employee had en-
gaged in violent workplace conduct, Employer A would not be liable un-
less it knew the information was false or provided the information in
reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.
The proposed disclosure-shield statute promotes disclosure of violent
conduct in job references. To meet this disclosure objective, the statute
provides guidance as to the kind of conduct employers would be required
to disclose. The definition of workplace violence includes assaults and
batteries, threats of violence, fighting, possession of weapons in the work-
place, harassment and intimidation of coworkers, and sexual harassment
involving physical intimidation, assault or battery. 200 This definition cap-
tures headline-grabbing cases of extreme violence as well as more preva-
lent, non-fatal violent incidents. 20 1
The proposed affirmative duty to disclose workplace violence in job
references is limited. It does not require disclosure of displays of anger,
loss of temper, or frustration on the job.20 2 Nor would the duty require
employers to disclose incidents with purely economic consequences, such
as theft, embezzlement, or similar offenses.20 3 The statute requires disclo-
sure of violent conduct that physically injured or posed a significant risk
of physical injury to employees, customers, or clients in the workplace.2°4
This approach strikes a balance between ensuring adequate protection
from violent employees and preserving an employee's interest in not hav-
ing job opportunities foreclosed where his or her conduct did not involve
violence against others.
200 See Rebecca A. Speer, Beyond 101 California: Four Years After the Tragic Shooting Work-
place Violence is Still With Us, S.F. Att'y, July 1997, at 22-23; see also Saxton, supra note 127, at
97; Swerdlow, supra note 194, at 1653.
201 As the American Management Association concluded following a 1994 survey, "[I]ncidents of
workplace violence are not unusual; however, the sorts of incidents involving gunplay or explo-
sives which grab headlines are infrequent." American Management Association, Workplace Vio-
lence: Policies, Procedures & Incidents (American Management Ass'n 65th Annual Human Re-
sources Conference Onsite Survey) Apr. 9-13, 1994.
202 Compare Professor Saxton's proposed disclosure duty, which would include "violent temper."
Saxton, supra note 127, at 97.
203 Of course, state legislatures would be free to include such behavior within the statutory
scheme. Cf. Swerdlow, supra note 194, at 1653 (describing conduct that would be covered by the
affirmative duty to disclose, including theft, destruction of property, lack of competence and falsi-
fication of credentials).
204 While it is not possible to set forth a "bright-line" definition, the proposed definition suffi-
ciently comports with a common-sense view of what constitutes violent behavior. In any event, the
statute should encourage employers to err on the side of disclosure in close cases rather than ad-
hering to a "no comment" policy. See Saxton, supra note 127, at 97.
[Vol. 5:2326
1998] Beyond Name, Rank, and Serial Number
Although the proposed disclosure-shield framework may be consid-
ered a significant departure from common law principles, legislatures are
better equipped than courts to consider the competing concerns that give
rise to the need for disclosures.20 5 Legislators can take a more aggressive
approach than judges in balancing competing interests of workplace
safety, promoting communication of important information about danger-
ous employees, and balancing the concerns of individual employees
against the societal concerns about workplace violence and a more open
flow of reference information. In addition, the reference shield statute pro-
vides employers with notice of the obligation accompanying the immunity
granted by the statute. Legislatures could, and should, send a strong signal
that society will no longer permit employers to hide behind silence poli-
cies where disclosure could deter workplace violence. By adding this lim-
ited affirmative duty provision to reference shield statutes, legislatures
could change employers' incentives in cases of workplace violence and
promote workplace safety in the process. 20 6 Where an employer has
knowledge of an employee's violent conduct in the workplace, the duty to
release information should be a legally enforceable one rather than a mere
"imperfect obligation of a moral or social character. ' 20 7
205 In contrast to legislatures, the role of courts is to interpret rather than make broad changes in
the law. As Steven Vago noted, "Unlike legislative and administrative bodies, courts do not place
issues on their own agendas .... Rather, courts are passive; they must wait until matters are
brought to them for resolution." Steven Vago, Law and Society 62 (4th ed. 1994).
206 The proposed duty would specifically address situations of workplace violence and would be
limited to information regarding violent behavior. 1 do not propose creating an affirmative duty for
employers to provide references outside the context of violent conduct. Accordingly, the proposed
duty is narrower than the "negligent referral" tort proposed by Swerdlow and the model legislation
proposed by Saxton. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. In contrast, Adler and Peirce do
not favor imposing a general duty to provide employment references. They remain grudgingly
"open but unconvinced" regarding a "duty to warn of a former employee's dangerous propensities"
and would limit any such duty to "alert[ing] public authorities about the danger, if it is sufficiently
grave, clear, and imminent, rather than to notify prospective employers." Adler & Peirce, supra
note 199, at 1447. Adler and Peirce argue for "positive incentives ... rather than the threat of dam-
ages, to motivate employers to abandon their no comment stance when queried about references."
Id. They propose reforming the qualified privilege and adding an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism for job reference cases to encourage employers to provide references. With regard to
any duty to warn regarding violent employees, Adler and Peirce would limit such disclosures to
cases in which "an employer has learned on a confidential basis that an employee imminently plans
to assault a readily identifiable victim or class of victims." Id. at 1445. This duty formula is so
narrow that it is of little practical use. Adler and Peirce acknowledge this in a footnote, where they
write: "We note in passing that this circumstance would rarely arise with respect to employment
references because an employer would usually have little knowledge about an employee's intention
to assault someone at the site of a prospective employer." Id. at 1445 n.304. The proposal in this
Article reaches a middle ground between a general duty of to provide references and the extremely
narrow limited duty that Adler and Peirce support.
207 Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
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Finally, states that adopt the model statute should include support for
programs to inform and educate employers about the existence of the ref-
erence shield laws and the limited disclosure obligation. Human resource
management organizations should be involved in educating employers re-
garding the disclosure-shield laws. Legislatures should assure that infor-
mation reaches the popular and legal press so that employers will be aware
of the existence of the duty. Employers will then be able to seek legal ad-
vice about their disclosure responsibility, as well as the immunities pro-
vided by the shield portions of the statutes. Because many smaller em-
ployers lack access to information about changes in laws, this information
process is critical to providing notice so that employers will know their
obligations and abandon silence policies in appropriate circumstances.
20 8
C. Striking a Balance: Costs and Benefits
of the Disclosure-Shield Framework
The disclosure-shield framework will encourage employers to provide
reference information in situations where it is most needed-in circum-
stances where prospective employers can use the information to take ap-
propriate preventive measures regarding job applicants with histories of
workplace violence. By promoting the flow of reference information, the
limited affirmative duty to disclose will deter workplace violence because
dangerous employees will either be excluded from the workplace or
monitored more carefully. In addition, a disclosure duty will assist em-
ployers in their investigation of prospective employees, increasing pro-
spective employers' access to currently undisclosed information.
Of course, no reform proposal is perfect. As the court recognized in
Moore v. St. Joseph's Nursing Home, Inc., the duty to disclose may be
abused.20 9 A manager who dislikes an employee may use a negative refer-
ence to foreclose that person from future employment or to retaliate.
210
Racist managers may be more likely to characterize behavior as "violent"
when engaged in by employees of color. Moreover, malevolent motiva-
208 Adler and Peirce express concern that "[tihose most likely to run afoul of the duty will be
small companies without knowledge of the duty, and, perhaps, without insurance to cover dam-
ages." Adler & Peirce, supra note 199, at 1447. Legislatures can assist small employers by pro-
moting publicity and education regarding the limited duty prescribed by disclosure-shield statutes.
See also Alex B. Long, Note, Addressing the Cloud Over Employee References: A Survey of Re-
cently Enacted State Legislation, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 177, 225-28 (1997).
209 459 N.W.2d at 102.
210 Frances A. McMorris, Ex-Bosses Face Less Peril Giving Honest Job References, Wall St. J.,
July 8, 1996, at B1 (noting that "the new state laws could be abused by employers intent on retali-
ating against former employees" and that "[u]nfair and unfavorable evaluations could be used
against employees who try to advance their careers by leaving").
Beyond Name, Rank, and Serial Number
tions are not the only potential source of problems. Managers acting in
good faith may be mistaken about the facts related to incidents subse-
quently reported in a reference to a prospective employer. To avoid negli-
gent hiring claims, prospective employers may decline to hire a job appli-
cant after being advised that the applicant engaged in violent conduct in a
previous job. Thus, an employee who exercises poor judgment and be-
haves violently in an isolated workplace incident may become unemploy-
able. 211 Finally, employees who can attribute their violent behavior to a
mental disability may allege violations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) or state disability discrimination laws.
212
To minimize the negative impact and potential for abuse, disclosure-
shield statutes can utilize safeguards fashioned from provisions in existing
shield laws. Under the model statute, an employer who provides false in-
formation loses the immunity if the employer knew the information was
false or disseminated it with reckless disregard for the information's truth
or falsity. This creates an incentive for employers to investigate and
document alleged incidents of violence before reporting such incidents in
references. If they do not investigate and the information is false, the ma-
ligned employee would be able to bring a cause of action for defamation
or other torts appropriate to the circumstances.
In addition to requiring that the disclosures be in writing, 213 the model
legislation requires reference providers to furnish a copy of the written ref-
erence to the subject employee before sharing the reference with a pro-
211 See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
21242 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). State laws may provide greater protection than what is
provided under the federal disability discrimination laws.
213 Of the existing shield laws, three statutes require information to be in writing. See Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 44-119a(c) (Supp. 1996) (providing absolute immunity to employer who responds in writ-
ing to prospective employer's written request for information regarding written employee evalua-
tions, information regarding whether separation was voluntary or involuntary and the reasons for
separation); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (providing qualified immu-
nity to employer who responds in writing to prospective employer's written request for informa-
tion regarding "(1) written employee evaluations; (2) official personnel notices that formally record
the reasons for separation; (3) whether the employee was voluntarily or involuntarily released from
service and the reason for separation; and (4) information about job performance"); S.D. Codified
Laws § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1997) (providing qualified immunity to employer who provides a
written disclosure in response to prospective employer's written request). In addition, the Indiana
statute, while not requiring current or former employers to give written references, protects em-
ployers who provide truthful written information. Ind. Code Ann. § 22-5-3-1(a) (Michie 1997)
(stating that a person who prevents a discharged employee from obtaining employment faces
criminal penalties, but is not prohibited "from informing, in writing, any other person to whom the
discharged employee has applied for employment a truthful statement of the reasons for the dis-
charge").
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spective employer.214 If the employee believes the information is errone-
ous, he or she can take the opportunity to correct or clarify the facts with
the current or former employer. A written copy of the information also af-
fords the employee the opportunity to rebut any allegations during inter-
views with prospective employers. If the prospective employer finds the
explanation to be credible and believes there is no further risk of violence,
the employee may be offered the new job and a fresh start in the next
workplace. A prospective employer also could impose a longer probation-
ary period for the new employee and monitor his or her conduct closely to
ensure there are no further violent incidents.
On the other hand, it is equally likely that prospective employers
would take a "hands off' approach to job applicants whose references in-
clude information about workplace violence. Rather than risk a potential
negligent hiring claim in the event the employee subsequently harmed
someone in the workplace, many employers may decide not to hire such
persons. As a result, many workers would find that one mistake renders
them virtually unemployable. Admittedly, this is an unfortunate conse-
quence. Employees who would not again engage in violent behavior might
still find it difficult to convince prospective employers to hire them. 215
However, while an individual employee's violent conduct may be a one-
time occurrence, many violent employees are repeat offenders. 216 Legis-
latures must balance the harsh consequences to particular individuals
against the benefits to society in promoting and increasing workplace
safety. Given the risk posed by persons who have a history of violent
workplace conduct, the legislative balance should tip in favor of disclo-
sure. The benefits of deterring repeat violence outweigh the costs to indi-
viduals who have exhibited past violent conduct at work.
214 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-114(2)(b) (1997) (employer who provides written information "shall
send a copy of the information provided to the last known address of the person who is the subject
of the reference"); S.D. Codified Laws § 60-4-12 (Michie Supp. 1997) ("Any written response to
the [prospective employer's] written request shall be made available to the employee or the former
employee upon written request."); cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-3-1(c) (Michie 1997) (requiring pro-
spective employer, upon prospective employee's written request, to "provide copies of any written
communications from current or former employers that may affect the employee's possibility of
employment with the prospective employer").
215 A single incident of misconduct could lead to a lasting stigma that forecloses future employ-
ment opportunities. Existing shield laws pose a similar problem. In some cases, disclosure regard-
ing past workplace conduct may exact a harsh penalty against individual employees. As noted in
the Wall Street Journal: "Still another concern is the fairness of branding someone a bad employee
based on a single act or a single performance review. . . . 'Is somebody unemployed for the rest of
their life for getting into a fist fight? ... That's a real dilemma."' McMorris, supra note 210, at BI
(quoting Garry Mathiason, a San Francisco attorney).
216 See, e.g., Jim McKay, Job Reference Roulette, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 6, 1995, at Cl
(observing that people who engage in violence and crime in the workplace "often leave a trail of
similar behavior that goes unnoticed when employers decline to share what they know").
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The proposed statute also provides that employers who use the disclo-
sure laws to discriminate lose the immunity.217 Employers need to monitor
managers' practices to assure that personnel who provide references are
not violating applicable state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination.
This requirement does not impose additional burdens on employers; em-
ployers must comply with anti-discrimination laws with respect to all
workplace practices.
As noted above, employers who comply with the disclosure-shield
statutes may fear legal challenges under disability discrimination laws.
The Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, prohibits discrimina-
tion against a "qualified individual with a disability. ' 218 The ADA also
precludes employers from asking applicants whether they have a disability
or about the nature of any disability. 219 In light of the ADA's prohibition
217 Reference shield statutes in II states already provide that discrimination vitiates the immunity.
See Alaska Stat. § 09.65.160(2) (Michie 1996) ("presumption of good faith is rebutted upon a
showing that [the information was disclosed] in violation of a civil right" protected under state or
federal law); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-114(2)(a) (1997) ("presumption of good faith may be rebutted
upon a showing ... that the information disclosed was ... violative of a civil right" protected by
state law); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West 1997) ("presumption of good faith is rebutted upon a
showing that the information disclosed ... violated any civil right" protected by state law); 745 111.
Comp. Stat. Ann. 46/10 (West Supp. 1997) ("presumption of good faith... may be rebutted...
[if] the information [was] disclosed... in violation of a civil right."); Iowa Code Ann. § 91B.2.2a,
available in LEXIS Statenet 1998 (employer loses immunity if the disclosure "violates a civil right
of the current or former employee"); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1997) ("immunity
shall not apply when the reference information supplied ... violated any civil rights"); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 4113.71(B)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1996) (immunity does not apply where "disclo-
sure.., constitutes an unlawful discriminatory practice" under state law); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.178
(Michie Supp. 1 1996) ("presumption of good faith is rebutted upon a showing that the information
disclosed.., violated any civil right" protected under state law); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1(c)(4)
(Supp. 1997) ("presumption of good faith is rebuttable upon a showing... that the information
disclosed was ... [v]iolative of ... civil rights" under employment discrimination laws"); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 50-1-105(5) (Supp. 1997) ("presumption of good faith is rebuttable upon a show-
ing ... that the information disclosed was... [vliolative of.. . civil rights" under employment
discrimination laws); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.487(2) (West 1997) ("presumption of good faith...
may be rebutted only upon a showing ... that the employer made the reference in violation" of the
state employment discrimination statute).
218 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA defines "persons with disabilities" to include those who are
perceived to have a disability. Section 12102(2) defines "disability," with respect to an individual,
as:
(A) "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."
219 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) ("A covered entity shall not... make inquiries of an employee as
to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the
disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity.").
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against inquiries regarding disabilities, an applicant whose violence is
linked to a mental disability conceivably could maintain that a prospective
employer's request for a reference that discloses violent conduct consti-
tutes an impermissible inquiry under the ADA. Such an applicant also may
challenge the refusal to hire as discrimination on the basis of mental dis-
ability. Concerned that disclosing an employee's violent conduct may be
construed as taking adverse action based on mental disability, reference
providers may fear the disclosure-shield statutes place them at risk for
ADA claims as well.
With regard to the inquiry issue, employers providing references in
compliance with the disclosure-shield statute should focus on describing
the conduct of the employee when providing the reference rather than ad-
vising against hiring the applicant because of an actual or perceived men-
tal disability. For example, consider a job applicant with a personality dis-
order who assaulted a coworker while working at a previous job. The dis-
closure-shield statute would require the applicant's former employer to
disclose the occurrence of the assault in response to a reference request.
Nothing in the proposed statutory language requires the employer to reveal
that the applicant has a personality disorder or to attribute the assault to the
personality disorder.
In any event, it is unlikely that employers who disclose and receive in-
formation about violent employees under disclosure-shield laws will face
liability for such references under the ADA. The trend in recent cases indi-
cates that courts are likely to reject ADA claims by plaintiffs whose men-
tal disabilities cause them to engage in violent conduct at work. Courts
have dismissed such claims on a number of grounds: employees who en-
gage in violent workplace misconduct are not "otherwise qualified" for
their positions;220 accommodation of the employee's conduct would con-
220 See, e.g., Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 946 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that an em-
ployee with bipolar disorder who threatened and intimidated coworkers was "not a 'qualified indi-
vidual with a disability' under the ADA"); Palmer v. Circuit Ct. of Cook Cty. Soc. Serv., 905 F.
Supp. 499, 508-09 (N.D. I11. 1995), aff'd 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that employee who
suffered from paranoia and depression who engaged in workplace confrontations, made hostile,
threatening telephone calls to coworkers and supervisors failed to establish that she was otherwise
"qualified" for her position); Miles v. General Services Admin., 5 Am. Disabilities Cases (BNA)
351, 354 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (concluding that an employee "who repeatedly harasses fellow employ-
ees and who insults and assaults supervisors is not 'otherwise qualified' for his position"); Mazza-
rella v. U.S. Postal Serv., 849 F. Supp. 89, 97 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding that an employee with a
personality disorder who lost control at work, screamed obscenities and destroyed property was not
an "otherwise qualified individual"); Carrozza v. Howard County, 847 F. Supp. 365, 367-68 (D.
Md. 1994), affd, 45 F. 3d 425 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that employee with bipolar disorder whose
behavior was "loud, abusive, and insubordinate" failed to establish that she could perform the es-
sential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation by her employer).
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stitute undue hardship; 221 the violent conduct poses a "direct threat" in the
workplace; 222 or the violent misconduct constitutes a legitimate reason for
the defendant employer's adverse action against the employee. 223 Given
the danger posed by employees whose mental disabilities cause them to
engage in violent conduct in the workplace, it is not surprising that courts
tend to grant summary judgment in favor of employers in such cases.
224
Accordingly, where an employee who has engaged in violent conduct in
the workplace and seeks another job, the current or former employer
would be free to provide information, and the prospective employer who
declined to hire the employee could do so without violating the ADA.
The proposed disclosure-shield framework does not place an undue
burden on employers. The proposal does not require employers to provide
references in response to every inquiry by a prospective employer. Under
the proposed disclosure-shield framework, current or former employers
must disclose only in cases where the employee who is the subject of the
reference has engaged in violent conduct in the workplace. By adding a
limited duty to the shield law structure and tailoring that duty to cases of
workplace violence, legislatures can take meaningful steps to increase
workplace safety and facilitate dissemination of potentially life-saving in-
formation.
221 See, e.g., Gordon v. Runyon, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4959 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd, 43 F. 3d
1461 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that it would be unduly burdensome to require the defendant-
employer to continue to employ an employee with a mental impairment who, at various times, had
possessed mace and a stun gun and engaged in disruptive behavior).
222 See, e.g., Layser v. Morrison, 935 F. Supp. 562, 569 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding that defendant
employer was justified in asserting the affirmative defense that employee posed a significant po-
tential for harm after security guard told of having dream about aiming a gun at supervisor);
Palmer, 905 F. Supp. at 511 (finding that paranoid and depressed employee who engaged in work-
place confrontations and made hostile, threatening telephone calls to coworkers and supervisors
was a direct threat because of her inability to control her behavior and was dismissed based on her
past misconduct, not her alleged disability).
223 See, e.g., Lewis, 908 F. Supp. at 948-51 (finding that the conduct of employee with bipolar
disorder, who threatened and intimidated coworkers, constituted legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son for negative performance evaluation); Hindman v. GTE Data Servs., Inc., 4 Am. Disabilities
Cases (BNA) 182 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (ruling that the threat and danger posed by bringing firearm to
work constituted sufficient basis for termination of employee who suffered from chemical imbal-
ance); Mazzarella, 849 F. Supp. at 96-97 (finding that losing control at work, screaming obsceni-
ties and destroying property constituted legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating em-
ployee with personality disorder); Marino v. U.S. Postal Serv., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20151 (D.
Mass. 1993), affd 25 F. 3d 1037 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that hitting a supervisor constituted a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination of employee with anxiety neurosis).
224 See. e.g., Lewis, 908 F. Supp. 931; Gordon, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4959; Mazzarella, 849 F.
Supp. 89; Carrozza, 847 F. Supp. 365; Marino, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20151; cf. Crawford v.
Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that questions of fact existed where em-
ployee with depression and stress-related mental disorders, who was terminated for allegedly
threatening to kill or harm supervisor, asserted that supervisors lied about his behavior).
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CONCLUSION
In 1993, Paul Calden calmly walked into a Florida cafeteria and shot
five former supervisors, killing three and seriously wounding two others.
Two years later, the survivors and relatives of those killed settled a lawsuit
against Allstate based in part on the company's failure to advise Calden's
subsequent employer of Calden's history of violent conduct in the work-
place. However, Calden's case is not typical. There was evidence that All-
state had not merely failed to disclose but had affirmatively misrepre-
sented the reasons for his termination. In a more typical case, Paul Cal-
den's employer would have provided no reference, or simply "name rank,
and serial number" in response to a reference request. In that more com-
mon situation, the victims' families would have no recourse under the
common law or existing reference shield statutes. Had it provided a "no
comment" or "name, rank, and serial number" reference without misrepre-
sentation, Allstate would have been free to remain silent about Calden's
known violent behavior.
In today's world of increasing workplace violence, prospective em-
ployers need to know if job applicants have engaged in violent conduct in
the workplace. The best source of such information is the reference proc-
ess, where current and former employers can exchange information about
violent employees. The time has come for legislatures to recognize a lim-
ited affirmative duty of disclosure, reflecting society's unwillingness to
continue condoning an employer's silence in response to a reference in-
quiry regarding a violent employee. For an employer to remain silent
when asked for a reference regarding a violent employee is wrong and
dangerous. With the adoption of disclosure-shield statutes, such silence
not only will be morally unacceptable, it will be legally unacceptable as
well.
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APPENDIX A
State Reference Shield Laws In Effect as of February 1998
225 This column indicates the standard of proof for rebutting the presumption where statutes ex-
pressly state the standard of proof. Although the majority of the statutes are silent on the issue, one
can safely assume that these states apply the preponderance of evidence standard-the generally
applicable burden of proof in civil litigation. McCormick on Evidence, § 339 (4th ed. 1992).
226 Amendment specifically relating to employment references.
State Code Section Enacted Standard of Proof to Rebut Pre-
sumption of Good Faith
225
Alaska Alaska Stat. § 09.65.160 1993 Preponderance
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1361 1996
California Cal. Civ. Code § 47c2 26  1994
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-114 1989 Preponderance
Delaware Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19, § 708 1996
Florida Fla. Stat. § 768.095 1991 Clear and Convincing Evidence
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 34-1-4 1993 Preponderance
Idaho Idaho Code § 44-201 1996 Clear and Convincing Evidence
Illinois 745 111. Comp. Stat. 46/10 1996 Preponderance
Indiana Ind. Code Ann. § 22-5-3-1 1995 Preponderance
Iowa Iowa Code § 91B.2 1997
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-119a 1995
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:291 1995 Preponderance
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, 1995 Clear and Convincing Evidence
§ 598
Maryland Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. 1996 Clear and Convincing Evidence
Proc. § 5-423
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 1996 Preponderance
§ 423.452 1 1- 1
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State Code Section Enacted Standard of Proof to Rebut Pre-
sumption of Good Faith
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-12-1 1995
North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat § 1-539.12 1997 Preponderance
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 34-02 1997 Preponderance
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1996 Preponderance
§ 413.71
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 61 1995 Preponderance
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.178 1995 Preponderance
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6/4-1 1996 Preponderance
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65 1996
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 60-4-12 1996 Clear and Convincing Evidence
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann, § 50-1-105 1995 Preponderance
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 1995 Clear and Convincing Evidence
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.487 1996 Clear and Convincing Evidence
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. § 27-1-113 1996 Preponderance
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APPENDIX B
Proposed Reference Shield Statute
A. Definitions
1-5. For definition paragraphs 1 through 5, legislatures could adopt
definitions of the terms "employer,"227 "employee," 228 "pro-
spective employer, ' 229 "prospective employee, '230 and "former
employee"2 31 used in existing reference shield statutes.
227 Ga. Code Ann. § 34-1-4(a)(2) (Supp. 1997) (defining employer as: "any individual engaged in
a business, corporation, S-corporation, limited liability corporation, partnership, limited liability
partnership, sole proprietorship, association, or government entity"); La. Rev. Star. Ann.
§ 291 .C(I) (West Supp. 1998) (defining employer as: "any person, firm, or corporation, including
the state and its political subdivisions, and their agents, that has one or more employees, or indi-
viduals performing services under any contract of hire or service, expressed or implied, oral or
written"); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.452(2) (West Supp. 1997) (defining employer as: "a
person who employs an individual for compensation or who supervises an individual providing
labor as a volunteer"); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.7 1(A)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1996) (defining
employer as: "the state, any political subdivision of the state, any person employing one or more
individuals in this state, and any person directly or indirectly acting in the interest of the state,
political subdivision, or such person"); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65(A)(1) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997)
(defining employer as: "any person, partnership, for profit or nonprofit corporation, limited liabil-
ity corporation, the State and its political subdivisions and their agents [or any former supervisor or
the employer's designee] that employ one or more employees"); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.487(l)(b)
(West 1997) (defining employer as: "any person, firm, corporation, state, county, town, city, vil-
lage, school district, sewer district, drainage district and other public or quasi-public corporations
as well as any agent, manager, representative or other person having control or custody of any
employment, place of employment or of any employe [sic]").
228 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 291 .C(2) (West Supp. 1998) (defining employee as: "any person, paid or
unpaid, in the service of an employer"); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.452(2) (West Supp. 1997)
(defining employee as: "an individual who is a volunteer or for compensation provides an em-
ployer with his or her labor"); Oh. Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.71(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1996) (de-
fining employee as: "an individual currently or formerly employed by an employer") (Anderson
1997); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65(A)(2) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997) (defining employee as: "any
person employed by an employer"); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.487(l)(a) (West 1997) (defining em-
ployee as: "any person who may be required or directed by any employer, in consideration of di-
rect or indirect gain or profit, to engage in any employment, or to go or work or be at any time in
any place of employment").
229 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 291.C(3) (West Supp. 1998) (defining prospective employer as: "any
'employer' as defined herein, to which a prospective employee has made application, either oral or
written, or forwarded a resume or other correspondence expressing an interest in employment");
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.452(2) (West Supp. 1997) (defining prospective employer as: "a
person to whom an employee or former employee has submitted an application for employment");
S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65(A)(6) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997) (defining prospective employer as:
"any employer to which a prospective employee has made application, either oral or written, or
forwarded a resume or other correspondence expressing an interest in employment").
230 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 291.C(4) (West Supp. 1998) (defining prospective employee as: "any
person who has made an application, either oral or written, or has sent a resume or other corre-
spondence indicating an interest in employment"); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65(A)(7) (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1997) (defining prospective employee as: "any person who has made an application either
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6. The term "employment reference" means a communication
between a prospective employer and employer regarding an
employee's job performance or qualifications for employment
with the prospective employer.
7. The term "violent conduct" means battery, assault, threats of
violence, physical fighting, possession of weapons, physical
harassment, physical intimidation, sexual harassment involving
physical intimidation, assault, or battery, and other violent
conduct posing a threat of physical injury to persons.
8. The term "in the workplace" means at the employer's place of
business or at the site of customers or clients during a time in
which an employee is performing the business of his or her
employer.
B. Duty to Disclose Reference Information Regarding Employee's
Violent Conduct in the Workplace
An employer who receives a request for an employment refer-
ence from a prospective employer regarding a current or former
employee shall disclose in writing all facts relating to any incident
or incidents of violent conduct in the workplace by such current or
former employee. The employer shall send a copy of the written
disclosure to the employee or former employee at his or her last
known address.
C. Qualified Immunity for Disclosure of Information Regarding Em-
ployee's Violent Conduct in the Workplace
1. An employer or former employer who provides information
pursuant to subsection B shall be immune from civil liability to
the employee or any other person for the disclosure or any con-
sequences proximately caused by the disclosure.
2. This protection and immunity shall not apply if it can be shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer:
a. provided the disclosure knowing that the information con-
tained in the disclosure or the information upon which the
disclosure was based was false or deliberately misleading;
oral or written or has sent a resume or other correspondence to a prospective employer indicating
an interest in employment").
231 S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65(A)(4) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997) (defining former employee as: "an
individual who was previously employed by an employer").
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b) provided the disclosure with reckless disregard for the truth
or falsity of the information contained in the disclosure or
the information upon which the disclosure was based; or
c) provided the disclosure in violation of any state or federal
civil rights laws.
D. Protection for Prospective Employer
A prospective employer who hires an employee after receiving
such a disclosure and who takes reasonable precautions to monitor
and supervise such employee, shall be immune from civil liability
including liability for negligent hiring, negligent retention, and
other causes of action related to the hiring and retention of such
employee.

